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# **The Role of Political Parties in the articulation of the European Public Sphere**

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# The Roles of Political Parties in the Articulation of EPS

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Robert Sata

While many important social processes cut across national borders and have transnational institutions to regulate them, democratic participation still occurs almost exclusively within individual nation states. While in the last decades society has experienced a shift from government to governance, a move towards a practice of problem-solving, which involves multiple actors, political parties remain key players because citizens form their views about which policy options they prefer through the processes of deliberation and party contestation that are essential elements of all democracies.

This task group report is primarily concerned with the role political parties across Europe play in the articulation of the European Public Sphere (EPS). We claim parties are one, if not the most important actors of public spheres, and this is especially true for European-level deliberation. It is little contested in the relevant literature that political parties play important roles in fostering and maintaining multiple political loyalties in multi-level polities (McKay, 2004), thus it is important that we examine what role political parties play in the formation and articulation of the EPS, whether they contribute to its emergence or rather pose as obstacles to it. Our paper attempts to identify the consensus or contestation among political actors, as well as the openness or closure of various kinds of public discourses towards the idea of societal diversity on the one hand, and Europe – however defined – on the other.

In order to be able to assess the role of political parties in European public spaces, we will rely on qualitative data collected within the EUROSPHERE Project (<http://eurosphere.uib.no>), which is coordinated by the University of Bergen and funded by the European Commission within the EU's 6th Framework Programme (<http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/>). Our data sample will comprise 16 countries – 14 members of the EU plus Norway and Turkey as non-members, and for each country at least three political parties were selected: the two most important parties – government and opposition, plus a maverick party (for details see Sicackan 2008). Semi-structured interviews were conducted with approx. three-seven individual party members from the higher ranks for each party.

Our first task for this report is to map the orientations of political parties with regards to diversity and the European Polity. We will investigate attitudes towards the following four European policy issues that are most relevant for Europeanization: the European Constitution; European citizenship; mobility, migration, and asylum policy; European enlargement, and the EPS. Comparative analysis of our selected countries would enable us to test alternative hypotheses for the role of political parties play across Europe, and we shall test how diversity attitudes affect what parties say about European policy issues as well as the prospects of the EPS, while we test how party positions on European issues predetermine their stance towards the EPS. We will be able to identify what truly European themes are being addressed across Europe (if at all), and we could observe which European issues and actors increase in salience in this process.

Relying on political party Europeanization literature, we will examine propositions that partisan views on the EU are dependent on the policy preferences of the parties; whether size

and ideological position of political parties matters in establishing competitive incentives when it comes to EU; or parties can support or oppose the EU because of spillovers from other ideological positions they might hold. Our comparative analysis will provide evidence on whether political parties would use Europeanization as an opportunity structure or an ideology or whether Europeanization of political parties is determined by traditional cleavages, new cleavages, or Europeanization itself becomes a cleavage.

As such, our report aims to fill an important theoretical gap within the relevant literature as we hope to draw preliminary conclusions with regards to the ongoing theoretical debate on what role parties play in formulation the EPS. We shall test whether national party competition affects ‘Europe’ or not, whether existing political cleavages are reinforced by European issues, or whether Europe truly constitutes a new potential cleavage for party alignment. Another result with great theoretical implication will be the fact that our analysis will not only tell us if Euroscepticism has ideological properties, but we will be able to specify its substantive contents as well. Our paper could thus provide a preliminary answer to what extent parties view Europe as a public arena, and how Europeanization has penetrated into the internal makings of political parties.

## **1 Europeanization of public spheres and public discourse**

Although a large number of studies deal with different aspects of Europeanization, the researcher will only find that there is no single definition of Europeanization. Most commonly cited definitions all conceive it as some process of diffusion/penetration of European rules, norms, policies etc into domestic structures, policies, and discourses. Mair argues that Europeanization “encompasses the penetration of European rules, directives and norms into the otherwise differentiated domestic spheres” (Mair 2004: 341). Radaelli claims that it “consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli 2003: 30). In turn, domestic change in response to Europeanization presupposes that national actors re-construct their discourse and actively participate in public debate (for a similar logic see Börzel and Risse 2007: 492).

Two approaches towards Europeanization can be distinguished within the literature: rationalists institutionalism suggests the EU’s impact on member states follows a ‘logic of consequences’ while sociological institutionalism says domestic responses follow the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Sedelmeier 2006). Nevertheless, these two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and in fact can be complementary. We believe Europeanization is best conceptualized as an interactive encounter of the domestic with Europe. What matters is that domestic actors internalize EU norms as a result of a process of socialization and transnational networks act as facilitating factors in this process.

While there is considerable debate in the relevant literature on what Europeanization consists in, this report uses the term to describe a process by which topics of and salience of European themes, issues and actors become dominating in the domestic arena, more specifically, become part of domestic public discourses, identities, and policies – i.e. become internalized by the political parties. One can distinguish between vertical Europeanization that refers to national actors addressing European actors or issues, while horizontal Europeanization stands for national actors addressing issues or actors another member state. One could argue that external and internal dimensions of Europeanization could be distinguished, where external Europeanization means an elite-based process of cooperation with international bodies that lead to programs, values, and discourses changed accordingly. Internal Europeanization, on the other hand, is a process that affects internal organization,

membership or constituency and popular perceptions (Agh 2004) of given actors, thus the positions political parties will assume on different issues.

The overwhelming majority of previous Europeanization studies have focused on the effects of EU rules and regulations on domestic institutions, emphasizing a top-down approach, where the main subject of inquiry is how member states respond to European pressure (Börzel 1999, Olsen 2002, Radaelli 2000, Wallace 2000). Naturally, other studies concentrated on how domestic politics shape attitudes towards Europeanization and how national structures influence the creation of supranational structures (Wallace and Wallace 1996, Hooghe 1995, Marks et al 1996). In this report, we chose the bottom-up approach and examine how intergroup dynamics and contextual characteristics affect the attitudes of politicians towards Europe.

Notwithstanding this approach, we claim that attitudes towards Europe and European issues are products of a multi-level identity dynamics as these are influenced by social identity processes. This interactive character of attitude formation is responsible for different actors understanding Europeanization in different ways, depending on cleavage structures, political culture or institutional or organizational settings (De Winter 2001). In order to explain how these identity dynamics shape attitudes towards Europeanization, we examine how identities are constructed at the different levels because the specific context of identity formation will play a decisive role in determining attitudes towards particular EU policies and regulations. (Mols and Haslam 2008: 445) The extent to which references to EU norms actually result in changes in preferences depends on the domestic political context and on the policy area in question (Grabbe 2003).

The EU subsidiary principle of devolved power demands a difficult balancing of a multiplicity of identities within member states, thus Europeanization challenges boundary construction that is essential for the creation and maintenance of national identities. Our goal in this paper is to examine to what extent national identity or national culture constitutes an obstacle for Europeanization, and to what extent multiple and cross-cutting identities that allow for the development of a European belonging are present within public discourses, in other words, whether issues of Europeanization have been ‘domesticated’ (Gwiazda 2002: 13), whether public spheres have been Europeanized.

Historically, Europe was the homeland of nation-states and it is only in the last two decades that cultural diversity has become an important recurrent topic in Europe’s political discourse. When it comes to the implications of Europeanization on national identity, it is generally accepted that European politics are largely independent from debates over ‘national sovereignty’ (Hix and Lord 1997). Yet, in all member-states of the EU, the projected identity of Europeanness is in constant competition with the various national identities that act as ‘defensive identities’. Different studies dispute the meaning and implications of Europeanization on national identity and vice versa, but it is commonly accepted that Europeanization in general and issues concerned with life style, cultural diversity, nationalism, immigration or asylum policy in particular do interact with conceptions of national identity, which in turn can both bolster support for and be the most ‘powerful break’ on Europeanization (Hooghe and Marks 2004).

Diversity and especially cultural diversity is important because cultures determine group and individual behavior, and by portraying values and norms, they create identities. We believe cultural identity is neither primordial nor instrumental but contingent and contextual. This means identities are historically constructed and, second, they are always relational and multiple. Contingency refers to a particular type of group self-identification along multiple axes of identification, salient in greatly diverse group interactions. The particular expression of collective identity is a function of a conjunction and constellation of factors, meaning it is contextual (Bush and Keyman 1997). As a result, identity is a critical factor for

Europeanization and it is imperative to understand how and when identity is mobilized in relation to Europe (Hooghe and Marks 2008).

Habermas conceived the public sphere as an arena not only for the perception but also for the treatment of different problems affecting society as a whole (Habermas 1962, 1996). We argue that an appropriately European public sphere, a European deliberative arena, could be the solution for problems associated with the conflict between national identity and European integrations. As such, we subscribe to the view that the public sphere is needed if only to provide information on which citizens can form their opinion and base their choices of policy (Follesdal and Hix 2005). The formation of transnational public spheres that are inclusive and legitimate, the creation of a European public sphere is needed in order for citizens “to learn to mutually recognize one another as members of a common political existence beyond national borders” (Habermas 2001: 99). We believe this does not have to translate in a demand for a European identity as Habermas (2003) would suggest, nor an adaptation of some sort of European high culture, but mediated processes of communication are indispensable for enabling any process aiming to reach some commonality on the European level.

We claim the EPS is a democratic model that can give voice and influence to diverse social groups from many different sectors. Inclusion can be done ‘from below’ along the lines of the ‘politics of difference’ suggested by Iris Marion Young (1990) or ‘from above’, for example Anne Phillips’ ‘politics of presence’ (Phillips 1995). If we want to make sense of the development of the European Union and where its future might be, we need to examine how one can create new transnational public powers and how can we make these accountable to new, transnational publics (Fraser 2007: 23). Europeanization magnifies tensions between transnational and national perspectives as the development of the EU polity, including recent EU enlargement, has increased diversity within the EU – contributing to what some have called ‘complex diversity’ (Kraus 2009). Europeanization provides new social and political conditions for the participation and belongings of very diverse social groups that underscores the need to analyze how different public policy regimes intersect with multiculturalism and diversity (Beck 2002).

We believe diversity and public policy can be best reconciled through debate and contestation taking place in public spheres. In consequence, for the purposes of this report, we understand public spheres being constituted by communication. Communications are to be public because the classic liberal public/private dichotomy does not hold since even private organizations have their own ‘publics’ (Fraser 2007). Public communication can be delineated by boundaries, which are constructed based on criteria such as territorial-political borders, but also on functionality, institutions, or associations; thus creating public spaces or social spaces that can be bound by non-spatial criteria (Bader 2008). What is important is that these spheres of communication are open to all, both active and passive participants.

We conceptualize the Europeanization of public discourses or political communication as a process that has multiple dimensions. As such, we can speak of the Europeanization of content (which topics are discussed and in what manner?); the Europeanization of public identities (are national or European perspective dominant?); and the Europeanization of communication flows (is there communication across borders?). While in different contexts, some dimensions of political discourse might become more salient than others, what is important is that Europeanization of public discourse is always multidimensional and it is not a yes or no question but something that is gradual (Peters et al 2005: 142).

## **2 Europeanization of political parties**

Political parties are the principal actors of public discourses, yet the role of parties aggregating and mediating preferences is weakening as we see more and more of advocacy democracy in the world shifting from government to governance. Multiple actors, including

government, corporate interest, civil society and other social actors play an important role in this new milieu. Nevertheless, political parties remain key players not only because parliaments are still dominated by parties, but because citizens form their views on policy options based on party cues and competition. Political competition is much more than the electoral race, it can take the form of debate or deliberation as well as consensus building and the practice of democratic competition is essential for public opinion formation (Follesdal and Hix 2005). The way national identities constrain attitudes over European integration depends on whether national identity is conceived by main actors (political parties) as exclusive or inclusive of other identities (Hooghe and Marks 2008). It is thus political parties that can play important roles in fostering political loyalties (McKay, 2004) not only on the national but the trans-national level, too.

Many claim that Europe is facing a democratic deficit because European citizens have very little information about the EU and the politics of EU institutions. Others argue the biggest problem is the lack of a common European culture, identity or ideology – often identified as a cultural deficit of the EU. Some believe that there is no real problem, stressing that the EU is a regulatory state that is better off without democratic standards (Majone 1998). Others claim that the involvement of both directly and indirectly elected representatives in the system of European governance creates a structure with sufficient checks and balances for accountability and legitimacy (Moravcsik 2002). Yet others disagree and claim that the complexity of the EU is the primary challenge for the accountability and legitimacy of European governance (Benz 2006). All critics agree nevertheless that it should be the political parties that bring Europe closer to the average citizen.

Countless studies have shown that European issues are marginal in national elections and political parties campaign primarily on domestic political agendas – even in European Parliament elections, therefore no electoral forum focuses directly on European issues (Hix 1999, Marks et al, 2002). The absence of a ‘European’ element in political contestation means that EU citizens’ preferences on European issues often have little or no influence on EU policy outcomes. Many claim that the fundamental flaw of Europeanization is this lack of open competition, of public debate as no articulation of debate positions (by the political parties) results in lack of voter salience on European issues. While Moravcsik claims that any effort to expand participation is unlikely to overcome apathy since European voters do not attribute salience to EU legislative and regulatory activity (Moravcsik, 2002), Simon Hix (2005) argues that European parties can be facilitators of politicization that would lead to more participation of the public.

Applied to party research, Europeanization usually transposes the focus on how Europe affects areas of: (1) policy and programmatic content; (2) organization; (3) patterns of party competition; (4) party-government relations; and (5) relations beyond the national party system (Ladrech 2002: 396). A large number of political scientists have studied aspects of European integration among national parties, and the key debate regarding political parties and Europe is over the relationship of Europeanization to the traditional political cleavages, and whether, and to what extent, this constitutes a new basis for party positioning and mobilizing campaigns. Some see party contestation over Europe having few ‘spill over’ effects and limited impact on the national party politics (Mair 2000). Scholars claim the extent to which Europeanization has penetrated into political systems is minimal as Europeanization is absorbed within pre-existing cleavages (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996, 2004, Marks and Wilson 2000). Hooghe and Marks et al (2001, 2004) claim the two dimensions of more/less integration and the left/right divide are not necessarily as independent from each other as Hix and Lord (1997) suggest, and argue that a party’s position on ‘new politics cleavage’ – green-alternative-libertarian (GAL) versus a traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (TAN) – is a much stronger predictor of its support for European

integration. Yet others claim that Europeanization causes the emergence of a new cleavage in the Rokkian sense that is restructuring the transformation of the political space along the lines of a conflict between losers and winners of denationalization in politics, economics, and culture (Kriesi 2005).

Another set of explanations of Europeanization of political parties claims that strategic positioning of parties relative to each other is more important than ideological differences among parties in determining support for integration. Thus, Hix (1999) subscribes to the idea of a 'politics of opposition' by marginal parties, claiming that mainstream parties will maintain the 'status quo' by incorporating European integration issues into the traditional axis of party contestation while marginal parties will challenge this status quo by exploiting Euroscepticism in domestic contestation since mainstream parties have a built-in advantage over domestic issues (Enyedi 2005, Ladrech 2004). Thus, parties' positions on Europe cross-cut left/right divisions, and mainstream parties tend to be pro-integrationist, with Euroscepticism confined to the marginal poles of the political spectrum, resulting in the inverted 'U' pattern that is confirmed in empirical studies (Hix and Lord 1997, Taggart 1998, Aspinwall 2002, Hooghe and Marks et al 2004, Marks and Wilson 2000, Marks and Steenbergen 2004, Bielasiak 2005; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004; Sitter 2002).

Finally, as for the present study, our selected cases include Eastern and Central European countries, we must note that many scholars claim that there is a difference in Europeanization of parties and party system between East and West, claiming that in Eastern Central Europe (ECE), Europeanization shows direct effects unlike in the case of Western Europe (Lewis 2005, Pridham 2002). Given popular support for EU membership in these countries and the imperatives of accession, Eurosceptical positions were untenable at least for the mainstream parties. Eastern Europeanization is connected to the consequentialist logic, a hierarchical top-down relationship between the EU and the ECE applicant countries, with a power asymmetry that resulted in coercive adaptation of EU norms, regulations, and policy (Goetz 2003). As a consequence, ECE countries are considered by most of the literature 'downloaders' of European norms and values without any input into these (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004, Goetz 2003, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, Ladrech 2009).

We should also warn the reader that our report uses qualitative data on attitudes of political party elites. This choice could be warranted by the fact that much of the debate on Europeanization focuses on the nature of political elites in the member states (Higley et al 2000) being the most influential players of Europeanization. Nevertheless, a few limitations of this choice must be noted and most importantly, political elites tend to be more pro-integrationists than citizens, thus our findings cannot be generalized easily. Elites, and especially political elites are more knowledgeable than the public and they also play a crucial role in enacting EU regulation and are therefore crucial to the success of EU policies (Mols and Haslam 2008). Yet, elites are also rational actors; therefore politicians incorporate new structures and discourses as their own only in order to advance their own goals and interests. However, politicians' capacity to exploit Europe depends on domestic institutional barriers and interpretative frameworks, thus European structures and norms are as much opportunities as constraints (Enyedi 2005:11).

### **3 Research Questions, Hypotheses**

We have claimed that maintaining multiple contextual identities is crucial for the Europeanization of political parties, so we shall evaluate whether party attitudes toward diversity would explain party positions on European integration and the EPS. Accordingly, an exclusive (national) identity ascribed to parties will make them more likely to be critical of integration and the EU policies, and the more inclusive parties are the more likely they will participate in trans-European communication and collaboration networks and support the idea

of a European public sphere. More specifically, we examine what extent can diversity attitudes explain what political parties think about the future of Europe, immigration issues such as citizenship policy, free-movement regimes, or asylum seekers, EU enlargement, or the prospects of the EPS. The presence of common European themes is important as it is a prerequisite for trans-European deliberation as we can only communicate in a meaningful way (and this includes polarization and contestation), if we have a common sense of what we are talking about. As such we shall also examine how party positions on common European issues such as the European constitution, migration and citizenship, or enlargement affect political parties' willingness to engage in trans-European dialogue that could lead to the creation of a European public sphere (EPS).

The theoretical propositions of the Europeanization of political parties help us formulate a set of sub-hypotheses to examine how the ideological background, geographic location, or governmental role of the political parties might affect the position these assume on the issues we examine. Parties belonging to a particular ideological party family should adopt common positions because the external spillovers/incentives that would bring them inclusion in international party organization and benefits coming from this. Similarly, mainstream parties have governance responsibilities and given the presence and entrenchment of the EU, they have to adapt their policies and positions to this reality. Mainstream parties can hardly hope to mobilize electorate with these appeals, while maverick parties have no such considerations and can challenge mainstream parties with opposition to the EU. We shall also inquire whether parties of the East act differently from those in the West, i.e. whether it is true that Europeanization has a more consequentialist logic here.

Testing the above hypotheses, our report will be able to answer not only to what roles political parties play in the formulation of the EPS, but also provide evidence whether party ideology and party competition at the national level or other contextual factors explain how parties view European integration and the prospects of the EPS. Our results would also show the extent to which Europeanization has penetrated into political systems, and above all, whether it constitutes a wholly separate and new dimension in party competition, or whether it reinforces, is absorbed within pre-existing cleavages (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004; van der Eijk et al 1995; Marks and Wilson 2000). We would also be able to answer whether political contestation over European integration remains importantly linked to the neo-liberal/regulated capitalism axis or whether 'new politics' cleavages are more important.

Our analysis tests whether national public spheres and national publics are willing to be more open to transnationalization efforts and thus articulate a European Public Sphere; or the opposite: whether national collective identities, loyalties and commitments still prevail, which in turn only lead to the fragmentation of European public spheres. In order to do this, we will identify what are the sociological characteristics of people active in politics, and what are their common characteristics; what is the significance of European positions and activities within domestic politics; and what 'Europe' and European institutions mean for the national political elite; as well as what is the attitude of politicians toward Europe and the EPS. The systematic comparative analysis will enable us to examine which political parties were able to mobilize claims successfully over European integration into their national public discourses. Comparative results would also enable us to identify issue areas in which Europe has become the principal voice and those in which national politics – and hence national political competition – continues to play a decisive role. Testing these hypotheses will also inform us whether Christopher Lord (1998) is right that one of the fundamental flaws of European-level decision-making is the lack of open contestation, of debate; and whether parties are willing to become part of trans-European networks of communications and collaboration, and rather than assuming that a European demos is a prerequisite for genuine EU democracy, a

European democratic identity might well form through the practice of democratic competition and institutionalized co-operation.

#### 4 Mapping the Data

In this report, we concentrate our attention on the respondents from political parties in the 16 countries of the Eurosphere research project. Our sample of political parties across Europe is not representative, we do not have data on all the European parties, but our researchers were asked instead to select the largest government and the largest opposition party, and an additional maverick party – an independent party that refuses to conform to generally accepted views – for each country (Sicackan 2008). As such, our report only provides a snapshot on the views of the political parties across the 16 countries, though this should be a good approximation as it contains representatives of both government and opposition parties, adding additional color to the general view by including the views of non-conforming parties. Yet again, this is not an exhaustive view of available party positions. Our database contains 56 parties (see Appendices) as some of the research partners decided to include more than three parties per country in their selection, following the Eurosphere criteria for inclusion.

#### 5 The Party Respondent

Let us now briefly introduce our average political party respondent by checking our database. Table 1 details the distribution of gender, age, as well as position within the party of the respondents.

**Table 1: Party Respondents**

Respondent's sex		
	Frequency	Percent
Female	100	32.5
Male	206	66.9
Total	306	99.4
Missing	2	.6
	308	100.0

Respondent's age		
	Frequency	Percent
18-25	7	2.3
26-35	47	15.4
36-45	76	24.8
46-55	92	30.1
56-65	68	22.2
Older than 65	16	5.2
Not identified	2	.7
Total	306	100.0

Respondent category		
	Frequency	Percent
Organizational Leader	61	20.1
Opinion Leader	91	30.0
Internal Opposition Leader	31	10.2
Internal "Group" Leader	64	21.1
Other	61	20.1
Total	303	100.0

As the tables above show, one-third of our respondents are female, which is probably a much higher ratio than the one characterizing the file and rank of political parties across Europe, but it was a specific goal in the selection of individual respondents to have as much gender balance as possible in order to ensure that both sexes and their views are represented accordingly. On the other hand, this might affect the representativeness of the dataset in yet another way, giving more emphasis to otherwise underrepresented women within parties. Our data also shows that the large majority of party respondents are aged 26-65, with two-thirds being older than 35 years. Our respondents also show a relative equal distribution of positions within the party, though only about 10% of respondents are internal opposition leaders of the selected parties, while there are three times more opinion leaders present. Every fifth respondent is an organization leader, thus the responses are highly relevant for the parties we selected, as our respondents are in fact the top leaders of the selected parties. Notwithstanding the slight under-representation of internal opposition, the database provides a good approximation of opinions of party respondents from different layers of the party organization, and yet allows for the formation of a common party view since organizational leaders, internal group leaders and opinion leaders together form two-third majority.

However, the above data description is just to provide the general characteristics of the average political party respondent found in the dataset as we shall not analyze individual data given that we are primarily interested in party positions. The table below lists the selected parties and the number of respondents for each party, for acronyms please see the appendixes.

**Table 2: Selected parties**

	Party 1	N	Party 2	N	Party 3	N	Party 4	N	Party 5	N	Party 6	N
Austria	<b>SPO</b>	5	<b>GREENS</b>	7	<b>FPO</b>	6						
Belgium	<b>PS</b>	4	<b>MR</b>	3	<b>LCR</b>	3						
Bulgaria	<b>BSP</b>	6	<b>GERB</b>	5	<b>ATAKA</b>	4	<b>MRF</b>	4				
Czech Republic	<b>ODS</b>	5	<b>CSSD</b>	4	<b>KCSM</b>	6						
Denmark	<b>V</b>	5	<b>SD</b>	5	<b>SF</b>	5	<b>DFP</b>	5				
Estonia	<b>ERF</b>	9	<b>SDP</b>	7	<b>EIP</b>	4						
Finland	<b>KESK</b>	7	<b>SDP</b>	6	<b>SFP</b>	4	<b>PER</b>	5				
France	<b>UMP</b>	6	<b>PS</b>	12	<b>CRP</b>	6						
Germany	<b>CDU/CSU</b>	5	<b>SPD</b>	7	<b>GREENS</b>	6						
Hungary	<b>MSzP</b>	7	<b>FIDESz</b>	6	<b>MKMP</b>	6						
Italy	<b>PD</b>	7	<b>PDL</b>	7	<b>LN</b>	7						
Norway	<b>DNA</b>	4	<b>H</b>	4	<b>FRP</b>	3	<b>SP</b>	4				
Netherlands	<b>CDA</b>	5	<b>GL</b>	3	<b>PdVA</b>	6	<b>SP</b>	3	<b>VVD</b>	7	<b>FNP</b>	1
Spain	<b>PSOE</b>	7	<b>PP</b>	6	<b>IU</b>	7	<b>CiU</b>	7				
Turkey	<b>AKP</b>	7	<b>CHP</b>	6	<b>DTP</b>	6						
UK	<b>LAB</b>	3	<b>CON</b>	7	<b>PC</b>	6						

Since our primary aim is to present a comparative analysis of political party positions on issues of diversity, questions related to European integration, and the European Public Sphere, in the following pages we shall analyze party positions and not individual opinion of the respondents. Due to the character of our data, we have chosen a rough but simple method of creating aggregate variables to describe party positions: each party position is calculated using the mean values of the respective individual respondent's scores on a given question. Given our method of aggregating party positions, we were also forced to drop parties with fewer than three respondents, as it would make little sense to calculate averages for two or less respondents. This means the Dutch FNP (with one respondent) is dropped and our overall number of cases is reduced to 307 from 308, and we deal only with 55 parties in later analysis.<sup>1</sup>

Our initial intention was also to calculate standard deviation scores together with the aggregate party scores in order to have a general estimate of the unity within the party regarding the issues at hand but given the large variation of response rate per party – ranging from 3 to 12 respondents, standard deviation scores are not comparatively interpretable (though computed). Given most parties have 5-7 respondents, standard deviation scores could be interpretable only if one would drop parties with less than 5 respondents, but that would lead to only 41 parties left in our database, and we would have to leave Norway out with 4 respondents only for each party. As such, we retain our cases with fewer respondents, but as a result, we are unable to reflect upon how unified positions within individual parties are and we also lose information on how distant individual opinions might be from each-other. Future studies of sub-sets of the database that enable comparative interpretation could address this interesting issue.

<sup>1</sup> An additional note: in the case of CRP in France, interviews were conducted with several Corsican parties, which then were compiled into a single 'Corsican Regional Party'. We assume the different respondents represent very similar views for a regional minority therefore we aggregated these into a single party.

## **6 Making Sense of the Data**

As a result of the above considerations, we have a dataset of 307 respondents and more than 900 variables to account for the statements from respondents for 55 parties, out of which a little more than 670 are numeric variables. For the present analysis we only use the latter ones, as recoding text variables would have been a much greater effort than our time and resources permitted. Given that we do not consider text variables we are forced to drop a few numeric variables since they are coded in a way that they become non-interpretable without the textual context, but the number of these is very limited and should not pose any problem for analysis.

The design of our questionnaire is such that multiple broader concepts are measured with a range of variables, which in most cases ask the respondents to indicate the presence of or agreement to certain positions and statements. There are a few exceptions to this rule of defining variables in the dataset as some variables are coded into multiple values in the original dataset. In order to be able to calculate averages for these variables, we have recoded these using a scale of values, attributing the highest number to the most inclusive (from perspective of the diversity being a value) answer and the lowest number to the most exclusive option available.

## **7 Factoring Responses – Identifying Common Views across Europe**

In order to be able to make sense of this vast amount of data and to reduce the complexity of the data-set to enable more parsimonious analysis, we conducted factor analysis with all variables in sections 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the questionnaire to identify what is the underlying structure of our data. Factor analysis is a standard statistical method applied to analysis that deals with a large quantity of data and it looks for joint variation of different variables in order to look for interdependencies of observed variables and thus reduces the number of these. We have run a variance maximization rotation of the variables to estimate the common factors. The following pages will detail our findings and the results of factor analysis and enable us to identify which variables could be combined in indexes (factors) to be used in the later analysis of party positions. All tables presented are indicating the results of rotated factor solutions that maximize the separation of possible factors and are used as basis for the formation of indexes.

More importantly, factor analysis will not only make our data more parsimonious but it will also enable us to identify which were the most common responses among our party respondents. This in fact will correspond to what is agreed upon and what is disputed across Europe and as such we shall identify common European themes as well as common issues that are disputed by the political parties of Europe. A second contribution of our analysis comes from the fact that our questionnaire is designed to capture possible different aspects/dimensions of issues such as diversity, European integration, or the EPS, therefore we shall be able to identify which of these dimensions are most prominent for the political elite of Europe.

Whenever possible, we concentrate our analysis on multiple dimensions of the same phenomena. These dimensions might often be counterintuitive and occasionally even contradictive, but we believe that it is often that responses contain both negative and positive attitudes towards different aspects of the same subject of inquiry. We aim thus to build a more refined depiction with multi-dimensional attitude descriptors for political parties in order to best capture the opinions these might have on any given issue on the one hand, and to be able to further scrutinize the importance of each dimension in later analysis on the other.

In order to be able to run factor analysis, as a first step, we aggregated our database of individual responses on the previously outlined logic before the analysis in order to build individual party scores. This resulted in a new data file being created where individual

respondents were aggregated across parties, and the file was filled up with the party mean scores as the entries for the variables. When necessary we recoded the data to reflect inverse relationships and negative scores. Although we have already mentioned, it is probably worthwhile to note that some of the political parties have only 3 respondents, and aggregating might be questionable in these cases. While this number may be insufficient to create representative average scores for each party, setting a larger number of respondents as threshold would mean that large number of parties from our initial selection would be excluded from the analysis, so we go ahead with this limitation in order to have a larger sample. This method also helps us to deal with missing values, as averaging will cancel out individual missing values of the data-set.

On a technical note, high loading variables on given factors are always indicated in bold in the respective tables. All indexes are subsequently computed by taking the average value of all variables of the given factor with equal weight. This way, we are also able to bypass the problem of missing values, which are posing a particular problem in the last sections of our data base – a substantial part of the data is missing or is not coded numerically and we lack the information about why the data was entered as missing: either the respondent did not give an answer or the questions was not asked by the interviewer. The above outlined approach enables us to reduce hugely complex data-set into an alternative one that has a much smaller number of variables, which are conceptually more clearly defined. Since the created new composite variables are based on empirically identified common factors within the data, these also represent more reliable and meaningful measures of the concepts which are in the center of our analysis.

### **7.1 Attitudes toward diversity**

The factor analysis conducted on a the first set of questions asking party respondents how they define diversity and which groups are significant for diversity produced three factors (and explained variance) that we could identify as three sets of definitions of diversity: a definition of diversity based on mixed identities; a definition of diversity based on interest and belonging to clearly demarcated groups; and a definition that signals out cultural and linguistic groups as being important sources of diversity.

The first factor shows that for some respondents the sources of diversity are found in less tangible and clearly definable identities, or in other words, in identities which are transcending levels and can take many multiple forms (variables with high score on the first factor indicated in bold). This factor indicates that diversity can be seen as a mixture of identities that have less clear boundaries and are can not be easily separated along clear demarcating lines. The second factor shows high loadings of variables which indicate that sources of diversity can be found among groups which have a particular set of interests in modern society and would thus demand representation in public bodies and see implementation of some policy measures that would respond to their demands. These groups are ranging from those based on clear economic interest, such as social class to groups based on identities that can be clearly demarcated and thus could serve as a base for demands on public policy, such as religious identity, sexual identity, and generation groups. The third factor shows high loading of the variables that indicate cultural and language groups as important for diversity. It is interesting to note that these two are inversely related; meaning those respondents that specified cultural groups did not mention language groups and vice-versa. While we can only guess, this result shows that most respondents do not distinguish between cultural and language groups but consider one is encompassing the other group.

Based on the factor analysis three indexes are computed to account for views about the composition of diversity. The first index measures diversity as a concept of multiple and fluid identities and includes variables with high score on the first factor indicated in bold in the

table. The second index measures diversity as an interest based concept of clearly defined social groups. The third index measure diversity as based on cultural and linguistic groups. It is interesting to note that the item indicating national belonging as a source of diversity has almost equally high scores on both the first and the second factors, which might mean that conceiving the national is important for both fluid and more tangible interpretations of identity, and as such is the most important characteristic of diversity for everybody in the modern world. For our analysis, national identity was included in the second index because we think national belonging can be defined as clearly defined by the boundary of group belonging. As a result, we create three indexes to cover definitions of diversity: *fluid definitions of diversity*, *bounded/traditional definitions of diversity*, and *third cultural/linguistic definitions*.

Our next question on diversity asks whether respondents give any preference to some group claims over others. We have recoded all responses into a scale based on inclusiveness, no groups being mentioned having the lowest score, followed by all groups being equal, to some groups enjoying preference and as such we have a single variable on the preference regarding the *scopes of groups with legitimate claims* that averages the scores according to the scale of inclusiveness.

We also ask respondents what they think of ethno-nationally diverse societies. Our factor analysis reveals that no single factor enjoys preeminence but results are inconclusive. Given that we have no clear factor identified in the analysis, we constructed a scale to measure the value of diversity – *diversity as a goal*, diversity as a fact of life receiving the lowest value, diversity seen as a condition for society being in the middle, and diversity seen as a goal getting the highest value on our scale.

Turning to our next questions that address advantages and disadvantages of diversity and how to adapt to diversity, we conduct separate factor analysis on variables asking for advantages of diversity, disadvantages of diversity, and how society and the state should adapt to diversity along similar lines as we outlined above. Yet again, the factor scores are used to create indexes measuring particular advantages and disadvantages to reduce the number of concepts to a more manageable and meaningful number of dimensions.

The first factor analysis pertains to a set of 14 variables that measure the positions of party respondents towards diversity with regard to its advantages. Our factor analysis produces four factors, that form four indexes measuring four different ways advantages of diversity are perceived. The first index indicates that advantages of diversity are seen as something that enable the creation of more economically successful, dynamic and mobile society, with less rigid identity ready for globalization. As such, this dimension tells us that diversity is considered to bring concrete benefits and adapt society for economic and other challenges of a globalized world. The second factor clearly identifies diversity to be beneficial to societies in terms of increasing freedom, easing the rule of law and creating a more just society. Thus, diversity is perceived to bring greater rule of law and justice in the society. The third factor indicates that advantages of diversity are in bringing greater gender equality and new solidarity links in a society that avoids political centralization. The fourth factor indicates the understanding of the advantages of diversity as something that help to bring about less homogenizing society with more individual autonomy and inclusive national identity. Based on these factors, we create four indexes on the advantages of diversity: *dynamic and globalized identity*; *freedom, justice, and rule of law*; *engendered solidarity*; and *heterogeneous society and individual autonomy*.

Turning to disadvantages of diversity, our factor analysis produces six factors of which two do not show a clear pattern of variables and explain only marginal variance, thus these are excluded from our creation of indexes. Out of 16 variables, three do not show significant loading on any of the four factors and are thus also excluded from the creation of indexes

measuring the different disadvantages of diversity. Except these variables, our factor analysis produces four clear and more or less easily identifiable factors, though their composition is less clear than the content of factors measuring attitudes toward advantages of diversity, seen above.

As our scores show, the first factor sees disadvantages of diversity as being an obstacle for creation of solidarity links, individual autonomy and the creation of a society with less rigid identity. The second factor sees disadvantages of diversity as being an obstacle to create a more cohesive society, endangering national identity and the achievement of gender equality. The third factor indicates the view that diversity might be an obstacle to creation of freer society; it might challenge equality before the law and has potential for rising cultural tensions. The last factor indicates the view of diversity as having disadvantages for the establishment of more dynamic and open economy as well as a just society. These four factors are used to create indexes on disadvantages of diversity, which are: *broken solidarity and rigid identity*; *endangered national identity*; *unequal society with cultural tensions*; and *closed and unjust society*.

In the following step, we conduct factor analysis on the six variables measuring party attitudes on how ethno-national diversity should be regulated and how rights to diverse groups should be allocated. Our original data contained a multiple value variable, which in fact is coded as a scale variable that attributed higher values to more inclusive and lower values for less inclusive attitudes. The factor analysis produces two clear factors indicating that parties can be positioned on two dimensions. The first factor shows as predominant attitudes that indicate diversity should be recognized and regulated by the law by providing for special rules regarding special status of ethno-national groups and in form of exemptions, special provisions and similar mechanisms. The second factor shows the opposite attitude toward diversity, stating that diversity is not considered to be something that should be recognized by the law and enabled in any form of special status, but rather that the state should be neutral in this respect and treat all social groups in the same way. Again, as in previous cases, these two factors are used as base in the formation of two indexes, one indicating the attitude that special status should be given to diverse groups, and the other indicating that the state attitude toward diversity should be neutral. The two created indexes are: *special status for groups* and *state neutrality towards groups*.

Turning to questions on how to address the institutional representation of sources of diversity we see that nine variables measuring attitudes of parties on this issue produce three factors in our factor analysis. The first and strongest factor has high factor loadings from five variables, all measuring attitudes whether diverse groups, especially minorities, should have their own separate institutions. This factor essentially forms a dimension pitting attitudes supporting minority institutions against those that object to these institutions. The second factor combines variables that indicate support for diverse/minority groups to gain representation through existing institutions and it also shows that some respondents believe minority groups should be supported by the state. The third factor combines variables indicating the opposition of respondents to institutions of minorities/diverse groups. Based upon the overlaps among these factors we create the following indexes on how diversity should be managed: *adaptation through separate minority institutions*, and *adaptation within existing institutions* that combines the variable of the factors for adaptation within the political system and opposition to minority institutions.

The last set of variables in the section on diversity is investigating party opinions about how diversity should be handled at the level of concrete public institutions and policies. Out of 12 variables present in the battery, our factor analysis produced three factors that explain interpretable amount of variance. Three variables out of 12 do not show significant loading on any of three factors and do not show strong correlation with other variables, and thus are

dropped when making indexes. As a result, the first factor indicates support for minority/diverse groups to have their separate system of institutions and policies, as well as institutions providing public services. The second factor indicates preference for separate representation of minority or diverse groups through a separate set of political institutions. The last factors indicates beliefs in the adaptation of existing institutions and policies to make them more accessible and closer to minority/diverse groups, while at the same time avoiding the emergence of a separate system for different groups. In other words, the there indexes are measuring (in order of strength as they appear in factor analysis) partisan attitude toward adaptation through special system, adaptation through separate political institutions and lastly toward change in public institutions through adaptation that would make them more accessible to minorities. Based upon these, we create indexes for representation of minorities: *parallel systems for minorities; minority political institutions; and multicultural public institutions.*

Our last two questions on the section on diversity of the questionnaire asked respondents about what type of adaptation would be required from would-be immigrants. No factors could be indentified, therefore for the purposes of our analysis we just averaged all variables of this question, thus constructing a scale of inclusiveness of the responses. Thus we have the first score like for any other variable, except that for the index of *degree of adaptation required* the higher value means more adaptation required and thus corresponds to a less inclusive view of diversity.

## **7.2 Attitudes toward EU integration**

The next sections of our questionnaire ask respondents about their attitudes regarding different aspects of the EU important for our study. Following the same logic that was outlined for the previous section on diversity, factor analysis was first conducted with variables measuring partisan views on the future of European integration. Nine variables on the future of EU integration produced a total of six factors that could be interpreted; of which three are used to produce indexes to be used in the further analysis since the rest are weak in terms of explanatory power. The first factor of EU integration is a dimension that could be called partial integration, and it indicates positions that integration is to be increased in some policy fields but that at the same time, more autonomy should be given to member states in other policy fields. The second factor shows the existence of a dimension which pits positions calling for greater federalization against those calling for greater autonomy of member states. This in fact is one of the few dimensions that has a clearly defined position at both ends. The third factor, like the second, is again dimension that has clearly defined positions at both ends and it pits positions calling for greater centralization of the EU, which perhaps implies giving greater power to EU bureaucracy and central institutions, while the opposite end calls for greater democratization of the EU and by implication more role for citizens in its decision making. As with all other indexes, new variables were computed by taking the mean value of all variables which have high factor loadings on these factors. The new indexes created for the direction of EU integration are: *more autonomy in some policy fields but centralization in others; federalization; and democratic centralization.*

Turning to the impact of the EU on diversity, the factor analysis produced three factors, one indicating expectations that the EU will have a weakening effect on diversity in member states, the second indicating opinions that the EU will strengthen diversity in member states and the third pitting at opposite ends positions regarding the impact of the EU on strengthening or weakening nation states, national culture or national identity. Of these factors two indexes were computed. The first variable is combining the first two factors, which in fact correspond to opposing views on the same dimension. The resulting index has on the one end positions expecting that European integration will have positive effects on diversity

within member states, while on the other end are positions expecting that integration will have negative effects on diversity. The second variable is measuring positive or negative positions regarding the expectation of the impact of the EU on nation states, national culture and national identity. As a result, both of these indexes have two clearly defined end points, which also mean different concepts. The created indexes on EU's impact of diversity are: *strengthening diversity within and across member states* and *strengthening nation state, national culture and identity*. Both indexes are computed by taking the mean value of all variables, as is done with all previous indexes.

Factor analysis on the question asking respondents which groups should the EU give rights to does not provide conclusive results and it yields a substantial number of factors and strong loadings of variables on multiple factors which can not be identified in an unambiguous way. In order to deal with this difficulty, we create an index by separating items measuring whether EU should have the power to give *rights to interest-defined groups* or whether it should have the power to give *rights to identity groups*. The classification of individual items in groups could be done in the following way:

**Table 3: Extent EU could give rights to interest and identity groups**

	Component	
	1	2
V3.5a Groups should the EU have power to grant rights that cannot be revised by the Member States? Socio-economic groups	X	
V3.5a Groups should the EU have power to grant rights that cannot be revised by the Member States? Disability groups	X	
V3.5a Groups should the EU have power to grant rights that cannot be revised by the Member States? Gender groups	X	
V3.5a Groups should the EU have power to grant rights that cannot be revised by the Member States? Generational groups	X	
V3.5a To which groups should the EU have power to grant minority rights that cannot be revised by the Member States? Ethnic groups		X
V3.5a Groups should the EU have power to grant rights that cannot be revised by the Member States? Life-style groups	X	
V3.5a Groups should the EU have power to grant rights that cannot be revised by the Member States? Migrant groups		X
V3.5a Groups should the EU have power to grant rights that cannot be revised by the Member States? National belonging		X
V3.5a Groups should the EU have power to grant rights that cannot be revised by the Member States? Religious groups		X
V3.5a Groups should the EU have power to grant rights that cannot be revised by the Member States? Sexuality groups	X	
V3.5a Groups should the EU have power to grant rights that cannot be revised by the Member States? Territorial groups	X	
V3.5a Groups should the EU have power to grant rights that cannot be revised by the Member States? Transnational groups	X	
V3.5a To which groups should the EU have power to grant minority rights that cannot be revised by the Member States? Linguistic groups		X

The last factor analysis in this section concerns the scope of rights the EU should be empowered to give to diversity groups. Factor analysis shows only one factor with very high factor loadings. Consequently, we create a single additive index variable – *the scope of*

*granted EU rights* – by taking the mean value of all variables in the factor analysis indicating the smaller or larger scope of rights the EU should be able to grant to different groups.

### 7.3 Attitudes toward citizenship

In the following section of the questionnaire, respondents express their views regarding definitions of citizenship, conditions for citizenship; attitudes toward immigration and freedom of movement, as well as attitudes towards asylum; attitudes towards EU enlargement and conditions for enlargement. The number of variables in this section is larger than in previous sections, thus the number of indexes we create in this and the following sections is lower relative to number of variables.

Our first index measures the permissiveness of the criteria for citizenship (for immigrants) that our respondents enlisted in their answers and includes four variables measuring opinions of parties on how strict conditions for citizenship need to be. Factor analysis only shows two factors: one would differentiate *the case of children*; the other would just contain a set of *criteria for citizenship*. Nevertheless, we will use an additive logic for this item, the more items mentioned the higher the value. This is justified since the first factor loading scores show that addition can be done as all items load positively on the first factor, while there might be other dimensions present. The items included are listed in Table 4, the score of the index – which we call *criteria for citizenship*.

**Table 4: Criteria for Citizenship Index**

V4.1a Criteria for citizenship? Acquisition of citizenship should not be automatic for any foreigners or their children; it should be at state discretion to grant citizenship based on certain criteria
V4.1a Criteria for citizenship? Children of all immigrant parents should automatically become citizens if one of the child's parents is a naturalized citizen, even if that child is born outside the country
V4.1a Criteria for citizenship? Children of all immigrant parents should automatically become citizens if these children are born in this country, even if their parents are not citizens in this country
V4.1a Criteria for citizenship? All immigrants who have lived legally in this country for a certain length of time should automatically be become citizens no matter which country they come from

Since the first item has the opposite direction than remaining three, it is recoded so that its highest value reflect disagreements with the statement. Given that these variables are measuring different categories of inclusiveness of citizenship policy, it is justified to place them together and use their average value to produce their final score. The higher scores on all variables mean high degree of inclusiveness on separate categories. Thus, the index is additive in shape and higher values on all variables demonstrate higher level of inclusiveness of citizenship policy.

Factor analysis on the next battery of items that measure positions toward different type of applicants for citizenship reveal the *preferences in citizenship policy*. The factor analysis produces five factors, of which only first three have clear interpretable meaning and only the first two with sufficient explanatory power to justify their inclusion in the analysis. The remaining three factors explain low degree of variance and are predominantly driven by a small set of cases clustering on one end of the index and have a clear separation from other clusters. The first three factors show that some respondents would ease citizenship policy for *co-ethnic and united family*; others would prefer *culturally similar immigrants*; and third, some respondent would welcome either *EU rules on citizenship*, or the application of *immigrants that are accustomed* with the receiving country. The remaining items load on remaining factors not presented here and do not form part of any broader dimension empirically and are dropped from our analysis.

The remaining variable concerning citizenship criteria only produces one factor, thus the index is composed from all the variables of this question and it forms an additive index which lists the number of conditions of citizenship where higher values specify a more restrictive framework. The individual items included in the calculations of the created index measuring the strictness of conditions for citizenship – what we call *number of criteria for citizenship* – are listed in Table 5 below:

**Table 5: Number of criteria for citizenship**

specify the requirements for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship: Non-criminality record
specify the requirements for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship: Passing a language test
specify the requirements for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship: Passing an adaptation test
specify the requirements for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship: Own income
specify the requirements for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship: Renouncement of previous citizenship
specify the requirements for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship: Long-term residence

The next question regarding citizenship is measuring attitudes toward dual citizenship. This item is formed from two negatively correlated items on the first factor, indicating the existence of a dimension with opposing ends where higher values imply very inclusive attitudes toward dual citizenship while lower scores indicate restrictive values toward dual citizenship, meaning people should renounce their citizenship. The index – *support for dual citizenship* – is composed by recoding the first variable following the above stated logic, and the value of the index is the average value of the two included variables pointing in the opposite end.

The next question inquired respondents whether they would be willing to grant supranational EU citizenship. As this is a yes/no answer, our index on support for *supranational EU citizenship* is additive and measures the average score of the responses on the question.

#### **7.4 Attitudes toward free movement, migration, and asylum**

Our next section of the questionnaire inquires about politicians' opinions about free movement across Europe, which groups should enjoy free movement. The factor analysis initially yielded three relevant factors, indicating preferences for the absence of restrictions, preferences for restrictions based on economic arguments, and restrictions based on a cultural argument, or to be more precise, preference for the introduction of restrictions based on perceived cultural threat from the group in question. In other words the identifiable factors are: *specific restrictions*, *same rules of all legal residents*, and *discriminating rules* (against Roma and prostitutes).

However, as no factor has high number of variables and we need to keep the analysis as parsimonious as possible, these three potential separate indexes are computed into a single index measuring the degree of restrictions of movement parties might support. The second problem is the number of missing values is slightly higher in this section than in previous sections, which makes the construction of indexes based on few variables with binary coding more problematic as the number of respondents who indicated any single category gets very small. The index is measured as the average value of all eight variables indicating the degree of restrictions and groups to which these restrictions would apply. The second and the third variable are recoded so that their values are inverted since their higher value indicates support for no restrictions on movement. The index calculated in this way measures the degree of *restrictions on free movement* the party respondents would support.

The next question asked respondents whether they would grant political rights to non-citizens. Since this is a simple question, we just add up the answers for our cumulative index

on *support for rights-to-non-citizens*, the value of which is thus the mean score of all variables.

The following index is constructed following a similar reasoning and it measures the degree to which political rights would be extended to people coming from the EU and immigrants from third countries. The original variable offers multiple choices for answers, which in fact represent a scale with growing degree of granted political rights for immigrants, to which we assign values accordingly. The factor analysis shows that all variables load strongly on a single factor. The index – *granted political rights* – is calculated by taking the average value of variables listed in the table.

The next set of questions asked which groups of immigrants should be welcome into the country, measuring inclusiveness and acceptance of immigration. The factor analysis with 16 items produced two factors, first indicating preferences to let in *migrants out of compassion and acceptance of inclusiveness* and the second indicating preferences to let in *migrants out of interest and reason of human rights*. Both factors have fairly high loadings of all items listed in the table, as the two are positively correlated. Because of this correlation and in order to keep the parsimony in the analysis, the opinion about which immigrant groups are welcome is calculated using a single index which represents the average value of all items listed under the question. The index of *welcome groups* is calculated so that it adds preferences for including any particular group in the welcome category, and through that it calculates the overall restrictiveness of party views on immigration. The value of the index is the average score of all the variables.

The next question asked respondents what kind of policies regarding free movement would they prefer. The original variable provides a scale that has at one end no preferential treatment and on the other preferential treatment for both EU and third country migrants. Our factor analysis show that all variables load on a single factor. Since these are at the same time positively correlated, we use a single additive index of *preferential policies* that aggregates the means scores of each of the variables.

As part of the questionnaire on free movement rights, respondents were also asked about what was their opinion regarding asylum seekers. Accordingly, our next index is measuring permissiveness toward asylum seekers. From 10 items measuring partisan position on this issue, three were selected because they are fairly strongly correlated and have a larger number of respondents. The remaining items are weakly correlated between themselves and have a fairly limited number of respondents which reduces their usefulness in the analysis. More substantively, the content of these questions is more directing toward measuring satisfaction and perceptions about asylum policy, which makes them hard to combine with questions which ask partisan respondents about restrictions to be placed in front of asylum seekers. It would also be difficult to combine the later one in order to indicate the degree of restrictiveness of asylum policy. As a result, the index on *limits on asylum* is composed of three items listed below and is calculated as their average value:

**Table 6: Limits on Asylum**

V4.9 Are refugee and asylum seeker flows a problem for this country?: Some asylum seeker groups with known inability to integrate/adapt in this country should not be accepted
V4.9 Are refugee and asylum seeker flows a problem for this country?: Quota refugees should not be accepted if they belong to the problematic migrant populations in this country
V4.9 Are refugee and asylum seeker flows a problem for this country?: Other arrangements than individual asylum should be made to help refugees and asylum seekers in regional safe zones close to their home countries

### 7.5 Attitudes on European Enlargement

Our last section that deals with the EU on the questionnaire is concerned with attitudes regarding European enlargement, its scope and conditionality. The first set of items deals with conditions under which country would be accepted as a candidate for enlargement. The factor analysis results in four factors and these factors are used as a basis for the formation of four indexes. The first factor indicates positions viewing conditions for the EU mainly in terms of compliance with legislation of diversity. The second factor indicates preference for conditions that are based on the satisfactory performance of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The third factor indicates support for conditions for EU membership which is based on common cultural heritage, belonging to Europe and differential criteria for countries with different background. The last factor indicates support for conditions that highlight functioning of the economy and implementation of the integration policies under equal conditions for all. Thus, we create the following indexes on EU conditionality: *respect for diversity*; *performance of democracy*; *Europea preference*; and *economic development and respect for acquis*.

The second set of variables regarding enlargement is indicating the party preferences for the scope of enlargement. Factor analysis produced three factors, but only two would load a higher number of variables, corresponding to a *more immediate enlargement* aiming at immediate neighbors and a *wide, extensive enlargement*, encompassing all possible members. Yet since these two factors are not conceptually very different, we compose only a single additive index. The score is computed by taking the average value of variables measuring preference for enlargement of various parts of Europe. The higher values on this index – *limits of enlargement* – would indicate support for a broad scope of enlargement.

The last questions in this section of the questionnaire asks respondents to identify whether enlargement benefits diversity and if it does, which groups would enjoy the benefits. Accordingly, we create an additive index on the *diversity benefits of enlargement*, and another index for *groups benefited by enlargement*. Both indexes are computed in a similar way, including all categories to get a measure of the scope and degree enlargement benefits diversity. The more items/groups are mentioned the higher the mean value, corresponding to a more inclusive attitude to diversity.

### 7.6 The European Public Sphere

The last section of the Eurosphere questionnaire inquired respondents about their opinion about the European Public Sphere and European communication and collaboration. The very first question asked whether respondents believed there was a common European communication space or they rather thought only communication sub-spaces were present. The factor analysis reveals several factors, but only the first factor loads several variables. This factor indicates the position of our respondents that believe only sub-spaces of communication exist: that of experts, politicians, media, or social flora. Since the other factors are inconclusive, for our analysis we create a single cumulative index that we shall call *European communication sub-spaces* that will aggregate the mean scores of all variables indicating the respondent's belief in the presence of a sub-field of European communication. The higher the value of the index, the more sub-spaces are identified.

Our next item addresses the question whether the European communication space is exclusive or not. Our factor analysis yielded several factors, but neither loaded a significant number of variables. Thus for the purpose of later analysis, we create a single aggregate index using the same logic as described above, called *exclusion from European communication*. The value of the index is the aggregate mean value of all variables in order to indicate if respondents thought some category of people were excluded from the EPS. The more categories are indicated the higher the value of our index.

The next question asked respondents whether they would welcome more European level communication and collaboration. To measure this variable we create a single index – *support for more collaboration* – to collect positive responses on this question. If respondents welcomed more communication and collaboration, we asked them to identify how European communication or collaboration should be organized. While this question would have provided very important details on how respondents would structure the EPS, there are so many missing cases in the database that we are forced to drop this variable from analysis.

Our next item in the factor analysis tries to make sense of why respondents gave different formats for organizing the European public sphere. Our analysis results in three factors, the first grouping respondents who favor *empowering groups and a common political system*, while the second shows that respondents who would believe *publics must adapt* also think the European public space should enable everybody to make his/her *voice heard*, while our last factors shows that the public space should be structured to lead to a *sense of belonging*. Nevertheless, since this question is more about the rationale of our respondents' choices, rather than a choice in itself – which we were unable to measure in the previous variable, we shall not consider these factors in our later analysis.

The database coding does not enable us to interpret the remaining variables from this section, except the question asking about possible partners of collaboration for the respondent's party. Our factor analysis reveals several possible factors; however our variables only load in significant numbers on the first three of these. As such, the first factor identifies *European institutions and lobbies*, the second *the European Parliament, parties, and citizens*, while the third factor stands for *ethnic, religious, or gender organizations and networks* as possible partners. Although three factors could be identified, we decided to maintain the parsimony of our variables, and thus we create only two indexes instead of three that will provide us with a measure of respondents *addressing European institutions* and those who *address civil society*. We think this is the most important for our present analysis, and the new indexes will enable us to see if respondents have a preference for European partners or other types of partners. We will take the mean scores for each European variable to calculate the value of the index of European institutions, while the other variables will make up the index of those addressing civil society.

## 8 Creating Composite Indexes

The previous pages outline the major positions respondents assume with regards to questions of diversity, the EU polity and policies, as well as the European Public Sphere. Our analysis has also shown us which are those issues that are important across Europe, what party elites understand when it comes to diversity, European integration, or the EPS. We have also seen that some issue dimension figure more prominently than others, and based upon the scatter of responses on the different issues we can identify which of these are more disputed than others.

Factor analysis also allowed us to map the main characteristics of our dataset by identifying which are those variables that show joint variation and thus testify the interdependencies that were not known at the time of designing the questionnaire. Although we have indentified the underlying factors for the questions of our questionnaire and thus reduced the number of variables significantly, we still have a substantial number of factor-indexes to handle. Since in later analysis we only examine party positions and not individual respondents, we have only 55 cases to consider and therefore we need to further reduce the number of variables to consider in order to make analysis meaningful. Thus we review the result of our factor analysis and we create secondary composite indexes that will further aggregate the previously identified factor-indexes. Whenever possible we shall aggregate or combine the factor-indexes into larger composite-indexes, the value of which shall be the aggregated value of the individual variables included in the index.

Following this logic, for the section on attitudes regarding diversity, we create a total of eight composite indexes. The first of these is the **degree of inclusiveness of the definition of diversity** made up by the averaged scores of variables identified under the three factors of definition of diversity, which we combine: *fluid definitions of diversity*, *bounded/traditional definitions of diversity*, and *third cultural/linguistic*, since we considered that the more groups are mentioned by the respondent, the more inclusive the definition of diversity is. The second composite index relies on **the scope of minority claims** identified earlier and averages the scores of variables under this question. The third and fourth composite indexes would measure **advantages and disadvantages of diversity** aggregated into one composite index each, averaging the individual variables for these questions separately. Thus the indexes are composed in an additive way, all variables of the advantage and disadvantage factor-scores are aggregated for the composite score of the indexes. Our fifth composite index measures **diversity as a normative goal**, and as such corresponds to averaging a scale of our factor-index relying on the value of diversity as *a fact of life*, *a condition for society*, and *a normative goal*, where the last factor would correspond to the highest value on our incremental scale. Our sixth composite index of diversity measures **adaptation to diversity through separate institutions**, while the seventh composite index measures **adaptation to diversity within existing institutions** by averaging the scores of variables under these headings. These two factors cannot be averaged into a single index as they refer to two conceptually different methods of adaptation and state action towards diversity. As such the value of these indexes corresponds to the factor-indexes of state regulation based on *special institutions for groups* and *adaptation within institutions*. Our last composite index measures the **required adaptation** from immigrants and it is just another additive index, its value averaged across all variables on adaptation, meaning the higher values mean more conditions for immigrants.

Once again to be able to have a parsimonious analysis of our dataset we set out to create secondary composite indexes to further reduce the number of variables for the remaining sections of the questionnaire as well. Looking at the factor-indexes that resulted for the direction of future EU integration, we take the first two factor-indexes as our first composite indexes that measure **direction of EU integration as more federalization** and **direction of EU integration as increased decentralization and lesser institutionalization**, averaging the corresponding variables, but keeping the two separate because of conceptual differences. The next two composite indexes also correspond to the indexes measuring the EU's impact of diversity in two terms: *the impact within and across member states* and *the impact on nation state, national culture and identity*, as we cannot aggregate these conceptually different meanings. Thus our third composite index is the **EU strengthening national identity and culture** and the fourth one is the **EU strengthening diversity within and across countries**. The next composite index is an additive index, based on variables determining the category of EU right holders: *rights for interest groups*, *rights for identity groups*, which we average, claiming the more groups are mentioned the more inclusive **the scope of EU rights groups** is. Our last composite index for the section is similar in logic, it is an additive index on **the scope of EU rights**, averaging the different EU minority rights mentioned as outlined above.

We also create secondary composite indexes to be employed by later analysis on the attitudes concerning citizenship policy. Thus, our first composite index is **the degree of inclusiveness of citizenship policy**, measuring the criteria for citizenship combining and aggregating the factors previously identified on *citizenship criteria*, *preferences in citizenship criteria* and the *number of criteria* mentioned. This is an additive index that will have the average value of the variables listed under this topic using the following logic: we shall first take the mean value of the later two variables, which will give us a measure of the degree of state discretion in citizenship policy. This in turn is then can be averaged with the number of

criteria we identified in the first question and thus will show us the final value of the new composite index. Our next composite index will measure support for **dual citizenship**, while the last composite index stands for **supranational citizenship**.

To summarize the section on policies of free movement, migration, and asylum, we also decided on a number of composite indexes to be employed in the later analysis. The first of these is **the scope of restrictions on free movement**, followed by the index that conveys attitudes on the **political rights for non-citizens** that will take the average value of the variables listed under two of our factors: *support for rights for non-citizens* and *granted political rights* that are thus added together into a cumulative index. In computing this index we check for all those who indicated rights should be granted and we calculate the degree of rights granted— more inclusive rights meaning higher scores, and then we use this score with the first variable to get an overall index. The next composite index is **the scope of welcomed groups of immigrants**, followed by the index on **preferential policies on free movement** that are described above. Our last composite index to be considered in further analysis regarding policies of free movement is the **scope of asylum restrictions**, that averages all variables listed under asylum.

The composite indexes measuring attitudes toward EU enlargement are: **the scope of EU conditions** composed by all the variables connected to the factors identified as: *respect for diversity; performance of democracy; Europea preference; economic development and respect for acquis*. Our composite index is thus an additive index, meaning it counts how many conditions were mentioned for enlargement, and averages these for the final value of the index. The second composite index corresponds to the previously outlined index on the **limits of enlargement**. Our two remaining composite indexes for this section are **diversity benefits of enlargement**, and **groups benefited by enlargement** that correspond to the identified factors.

Last, for the evaluation of European communication and collaboration spaces, we pick the following cumulative indexes for the later analysis: **European communication sub-spaces**; the additive index of **degree of exclusion from European communication**; **support for more collaboration**; and the two additive indexes of **addressing European institutions** and **addressing civil society**.

Table 7 below summarizes our findings along these dimensions, identifying relevant factors and the composite indexes that we created for further analysis.

**Table 7: Summary of Dimensions**

<b>Dimension</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Composite index</b>	<b>Explanation</b>
<b>Attitudes toward diversity</b>	- fluid definitions of diversity - bounded/traditional definitions of diversity - cultural/linguistic definitions	degree of inclusiveness of the definition of diversity	made up by the averaged scores of indicators
	- no minority groups being mentioned -all groups being equal -some groups being mentioned	scopes of minority groups	averaging a scale where no groups being mentioned has the lowest score, followed by all groups being equal, to some groups being mentioned
	diversity as a: - fact of life - condition for society - normative goal	diversity as normative goal	averaging a scale where diversity as fact of life has the lowest score, followed by diversity as condition, to diversity as a normative goal
	- dynamic and globalized identity - freedom, justice, and rule of law; engendered solidarity - heterogeneous society and individual autonomy	advantages of diversity	made up by the averaged scores of indicators
	-broken solidarity and rigid identity - endangered national identity - unequal society with cultural tensions - closed and unjust society	disadvantages of diversity	made up by the averaged scores of indicators

	Minority regulation: - special status for groups - parallel systems - minority political institutions	adaptation to diversity through separate institutions	made up by the averaged scores of indicators
	Minority regulation: - state neutrality towards groups - multicultural public institutions	adaptation to diversity within existing institutions	made up by the averaged scores of indicators
	- type of adaptation required	degree of adaptation required	made up by the averaged scores of indicators
<b>Attitudes toward future EU integration</b>	- more autonomy in some policy fields but centralization in others - federalization	direction of EU integration as more federalization	made up by the averaged scores of indicators
	- democratic centralization	direction of EU integration as increased decentralization and lesser institutionalization	made up by the averaged scores of indicator
	- strengthening diversity within and across member states - strengthening nation state, national culture and identity	EU strengthening diversity within and across countries  EU strengthening national identity and culture	made up by the averaged scores of the two sets of indicators
	- rights to interest-defined groups - rights to identity groups	the scope of EU rights groups	made up by the averaged scores of indicators
	- the scope of granted EU rights	the scope of EU rights	made up by the averaged scores of indicators

<b>Attitudes toward citizenship</b>	- the case of children - specific conditions for citizenship	criteria for citizenship	the degree of inclusiveness of citizenship policy	made up by the averaged scores of indicators
	preferences in citizenship policy for: - co-ethnics and united family - for culturally similar immigrants - for EU rules on citizenship and immigrants that are accustomed with the host country	degree of state discretion in citizenship policy (made up by the averaged scores of indicators)		
	- number of criteria for citizenship			
	- support for dual citizenship	support for dual citizenship	Recoding the two negatively correlated items, made up by the averaged scores of indicators	
	support for supranational EU citizenship	support for supranational citizenship	made up by the averaged scores of indicators	
<b>Attitudes toward free movement</b>	- specific restrictions - same rules of all legal residents - discriminating rules (against Roma and prostitutes).	restrictions on free movement	Recoding the negatively correlated items, made up by the averaged scores of indicators	
	- support for rights-to-non-citizens	political rights for non-citizens	made up by the averaged scores of indicators	
	- granted political rights to non-citizens			
	Accept migrants: - out of compassion and acceptance of inclusive diversity - out of interest and reason of human rights	welcome groups	made up by the averaged scores of indicators	
	- free movement policies	preferential policies	made up by the averaged scores of indicators	
	- restriction on asylum	limits on asylum	made up by the averaged scores of indicators	

<b>Attitudes toward enlargement</b>	- respect for diversity - performance of democracy - Europea preference - economic development and respect for acquis	the scope of EU conditions	made up by the averaged scores of indicators
	- more immediate enlargement - a wide, extensive enlargement	limits of enlargement	made up by the averaged scores of indicators
	- scope of diversity benefits of enlargement	diversity benefits of enlargement	made up by the averaged scores of indicators
	- groups benefitting from enlargement	groups benefited by enlargement	made up by the averaged scores of indicators
<b>Attitudes toward EPS</b>	- public spaces	European communication sub-spaces	made up by the averaged scores of indicators
	- types of exclusion	exclusion from European communication	made up by the averaged scores of indicators
	- support for more collaboration	support for more collaboration	made up by the averaged scores of indicators
	- possible European partners of collaboration - possible non-European partners of collaboration	addressing European institutions  addressing civil society	made up by the averaged scores of the two sets of indicators

## 9 Analyzing Data

Having regrouped our dataset into composite variables that reduce the number of variables, yet still provide meaningful measures of our basic concepts, we can set out with our analysis proper. In the following section, we shall first endeavor to map out the party positions on issues of diversity, the future direction of the EU, citizenship policy, free movement, migration, and asylum policy, EU enlargement as well as the European Public Sphere. In order to complete this task we examine how our groupings of parties – the party families, government/opposition parties, East/West parties – position themselves along these axes, whether they assume distinct positions or there are patterns to observe or parties scatter along the political space in random fashion, proving heterogeneity of our groupings. This will also provide us with a preliminary answer for theoretical propositions of the Europeanization of political parties that would predict different positioning along the left/right axis of ideological distinction, or for that matter, the specific role played by government parties, or the special status of political parties of Eastern Europe vis-à-vis their Western counterparts. Having identified these, we can draw some preliminary conclusions about the role political parties

across Europe play in the articulation of the public debates and give some answers to the questions of to what common themes play a role in political contestation across the continent.

## 10 Grouping the Parties

In order to be able to make sense of our vast amount of data, instead of looking at individual party positions, we examine whether different groupings of political parties along different dimensions to confirm the theoretical propositions that were noted in the beginning of this report. As such, first we will divide all parties according to whether they are part of the government or the opposition at the time of the interview (between late 2008 and early 2009). This distinction will enable us to test propositions that government parties always convey a more pro-European attitude than those in opposition. Table 8 below lists our coding of the individual parties on this dimension:

**Table 8: Grouping of parties: Government vs. opposition**

Country	GOVERNMENT		OPPOSITION		
Austria	SPO		FPO	GREENS	
Belgium	MR		PS	LCR	
Bulgaria	GERB	(MRF)	BSP	ATAKA	
Czech Republic	ODS		CSSD	KCSM	
Denmark	V		SD	SF	DFP
Estonia	ERF		SDP	EIP	
Finland	KESK	SFP	SDP	PER	
France	UMP		PS	CRP	
Germany	SPD		CDU/CSU	GREENS	
Hungary	MSzP		FIDESz	MKMP	
Italy	PDL	LN	PD		
Norway	DNA	SP	H	FRP	
Netherlands	CDA	PdVA	VVD	GL	SP
Spain	PSOE		PP	EU	CiU
Turkey	AKP		CHP	DTP	
UK	LAB		CON	PC	

While the government position of political parties might be the strongest predictor of party position on different issues related to the EU or the EPS, as we already noted, we will also examine ideological dimensions of the political parties, and how these might affect the responses we receive from the parties on issues of diversity, EU polity and policies, or the European Public Sphere. Based on their institutional characteristics, we have grouped parties according to their main ideological predisposition into the following table:

**Table 9: Grouping of parties: ideological predisposition**

	<b>SOC. DEMOCRATS</b>	<b>CONSERVATIVE</b>	<b>LIBERAL</b>	<b>NEW LEFT</b>	<b>RADICAL LEFT</b>	<b>RADICAL RIGHT</b>	<b>REGIONAL MINORITY</b>
<b>Austria</b>	SPO			GREENS		FPO	
<b>Belgium</b>	PS		MR				
<b>Bulgaria</b>	BSP	GERB			KCSM	ATAKA	MRF
<b>Czech Republic</b>	CSSD	ODS					
<b>Denmark</b>	SD	V		SF		DFP	
<b>Estonia</b>	SDP	ERF				EIP	
<b>Finland</b>	SDP	KESK				PER	SFP
<b>France</b>	PS	UMP					CRP
<b>Germany</b>	SPD	CDU/CSU		GREENS			
<b>Hungary</b>	MSzP	FIDESz			MKMP		
<b>Italy</b>	PD	PDL				LN	
<b>Norway</b>	DNA	H		SP		FRP	
<b>Netherlands</b>	PdVA	CDA	VVD	GL	SP		
<b>Spain</b>	PSOE	PP			EU		CiU
<b>Turkey</b>	CHP	AKP					DTP
<b>UK</b>	LAB	CON					PC

However, since we aggregate individual party family positions by taking the mean values of individual parties, it is difficult to maintain categories that are made up only by a few parties, as our mean scores only gain significance if there is a larger group of individual cases to aggregate. As such, for the parsimony of the analysis, we created a category of LEFT that in fact comprises what we have first termed the new left and the radical left parties, as well as, we decided to include the two liberal parties under the CONSERVATIVE umbrella. This later decision could be justified by the fact the VVD is very much mainstream conservative, although we have to note that MR is not – yet it had to be placed into some category. Accordingly, we have only five party family groups that we employ at later stages of analysis and the revised party family or party ideology grouping is outlined by the table below.

**Table 10: Grouping of parties: Party families**

	<b>SOC. DEMOCRATS</b>	<b>CONSERVATIVE</b>	<b>LEFT</b>	<b>RIGHT</b>	<b>REGIONAL MINORITY</b>
<b>Austria</b>	<b>SPO</b>		<b>GREENS</b>	<b>FPO</b>	
<b>Belgium</b>	<b>PS</b>	<b>MR</b>			
<b>Bulgaria</b>	<b>BSP</b>	<b>GERB</b>	<b>KCSM</b>	<b>ATAKA</b>	<b>MRF</b>
<b>Czech Republic</b>	<b>CSSD</b>	<b>ODS</b>			
<b>Denmark</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>V</b>	<b>SF</b>	<b>DFP</b>	
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>SDP</b>	<b>ERF</b>		<b>EIP</b>	
<b>Finland</b>	<b>SDP</b>	<b>KESK</b>		<b>PER</b>	<b>SFP</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>PS</b>	<b>UMP</b>			<b>CRP</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>SPD</b>	<b>CDU/CSU</b>	<b>GREENS</b>		
<b>Hungary</b>	<b>MSzP</b>	<b>FIDESz</b>	<b>MKMP</b>		
<b>Italy</b>	<b>PD</b>	<b>PDL</b>		<b>LN</b>	
<b>Norway</b>	<b>DNA</b>	<b>H</b>	<b>SP</b>	<b>FRP</b>	
<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>PdVA</b>	<b>CDA, VVD</b>	<b>GL, SP</b>		
<b>Spain</b>	<b>PSOE</b>	<b>PP</b>	<b>EU</b>		<b>CiU</b>
<b>Turkey</b>	<b>CHP</b>	<b>AKP</b>			<b>DTP</b>
<b>UK</b>	<b>LAB</b>	<b>CON</b>			<b>PC</b>

Our final grouping of the parties is done in order to test the corresponding theoretical propositions if the division between parties on the traditional East-West dimension of Europe matters. Our guiding principle is probably the least contested in the literature, we group former communist countries and Turkey into the East category, while all the countries of Western Europe will make up the West category, as the table below shows. This distinction is not only warranted that it would draw a line between old and new or want-to-be members of EU, but it would also distinguish between the more and less developed, the old and new democracies, and fit relatively well with distinguishing between target countries of immigration from those that are at most only transit countries – all issues that might affect significantly how diversity or for that matter, the EU itself is evaluated.

**Table 11: Grouping of parties: East and West**

Country	WEST					Country	EAST			
<b>Austria</b>	<b>SPO</b>	<b>FPO</b>	<b>GREENS</b>			<b>Bulgaria</b>	<b>GERB</b>	<b>(MRF)</b>	<b>BSP</b>	<b>ATAKA</b>
<b>Belgium</b>	<b>MR</b>	<b>PS</b>	<b>LCR</b>			<b>Czech Republic</b>	<b>ODS</b>	<b>CSSD</b>	<b>KCSM</b>	
<b>Denmark</b>	<b>V</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>SF</b>	<b>DFP</b>		<b>Estonia</b>	<b>ERF</b>	<b>SDP</b>	<b>EIP</b>	
<b>Finland</b>	<b>KESK</b>	<b>SFP</b>	<b>SDP</b>	<b>PER</b>		<b>Hungary</b>	<b>MSzP</b>	<b>FIDESz</b>	<b>MKMP</b>	
<b>France</b>	<b>UMP</b>	<b>PS</b>	<b>CRP</b>			<b>Turkey</b>	<b>AKP</b>	<b>CHP</b>	<b>DTP</b>	
<b>Germany</b>	<b>SPD</b>	<b>CDU/CSU</b>	<b>GREENS</b>							
<b>Italy</b>	<b>PDL</b>	<b>LN</b>	<b>PD</b>							
<b>Norway</b>	<b>DNA</b>	<b>SP</b>	<b>H</b>	<b>FRP</b>						
<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>CDA</b>	<b>PdVA</b>	<b>VVD</b>	<b>GL</b>	<b>SP</b>					
<b>Spain</b>	<b>PSOE</b>	<b>PP</b>	<b>EU</b>	<b>CiU</b>						
<b>UK</b>	<b>LAB</b>	<b>CON</b>	<b>PC</b>							

Let us now present the expressed views of political parties on diversity, EU politics and policies, and the EPS.

## 11 Mapping Party Positions

In order to be able to map out the positions the different party groups assume on the different issues, we employ discriminant analysis of our composite variables to see whether any patterns can be recognized within our dataset. Discriminant analysis is a standard statistical method to classify objects or events in predetermined classes. Our purpose with this endeavor is to determine the set of cases based on the set of variables that are known as input variables – in our case the different grouping of political parties. As such, discriminant analysis will enable us to identify what are the factors (if any) that distinguish between the positions assumed by different groupings of parties on the issues central to our research.


We have run discriminant analysis for all of our sections of the questionnaire separately: attitudes towards diversity (8 composite indexes), attitudes towards the direction of future EU integration (6 composite indexes), attitudes toward citizenship policy (3 composite indexes), attitudes toward migration policy (5 composite indexes), attitudes on EU enlargement (4 composite indexes), and attitudes on European Public Sphere (5 composite indexes). All discriminant analyses employ our three groupings of the political parties that we described earlier: the party families, government/opposition parties, and East/West parties. We do this in order to test our theory-driven hypotheses and see if the different groups of political parties assume distant positions on these central issues of the Eurosphere project. Observed patterns will enable us to see what role party ideology, government role, or geographic location play in the formation of party attitudes on these issues.

All results of discriminant analysis are provided in the Appendices. Discriminant analysis produces several sets of randomized functions that aim to distinguish among the classes of data. Results are included in the tables, which need to be interpreted, so let us just briefly state the most important caveats. The *Wilk's Lambda* result is most important as it gives us the explained variance of the random functions. We drop all functions that explain less than 10% of variance as being insignificant. Function coefficients describe the make-up of the function, and for the present analysis we ignore variables with a coefficient score smaller than 35%. Those variables with higher coefficients figure in bold in all tables. Most importantly group centroid values describe the distinct position of our groups of political parties, the more distant the values, the more distant the attitudes of the parties. Consequently, if we find no function with explanatory power that means our groups of parties are heterogeneous, there is no clear separation among the parties and their opinion over the examined issue is scattered without any identifiable pattern.

### 11.1 Issues of diversity

Our discriminant analysis for the ideological party families on the issue of diversity results in two functions (Figure 1.) that combined explain more than half of the variance in responses (the first at 38.4%, the second at 17.5%). The first function represents the respondents who have an exclusive definition of diversity, they see mainly disadvantages of diversity, and they do not support adaptation of minorities through separate institutions, but rather prefer adaptation within existing institutions, corresponding to a very exclusive understanding of diversity. The second function also describes respondents as having an exclusive definition of diversity, yet their expectation is for little adaptation required from immigrants and they believe many groups can have legitimate claims, which is an example of having both positive and negative attitudes to different aspects of diversity.


**Figure 1: Ideological party family positions on diversity**



Our scores show that on the first function the right parties are on one end, and the regional parties on the other (with left parties are close to regional), while the rest of the parties scatter in the space between. The two most similar positions assumed are those of regional and left parties – which is somewhat unexpected, while social democrats and conservatives show a similar resemblance in their attitude that could be characteristic for mainstream parties. Turning to the second function, we observe the opposite: social democrats are on one end, while conservatives are on the other, so in fact the proposition that mainstream parties will always crowd the center is violated. Regional parties resemble most the conservatives in the position they assume, while interestingly enough left and right parties have rather similar views, which would be against the traditional left/right divide.

Running discriminant analysis on the government vs. opposition party groups shows that party opinions on diversity are formed irrespective of the party’s membership in government, although one would expect government parties to have more inclusive views on diversity. Discriminant analysis of the East/West party groups’ opinions on the issues of diversity results in a single function that explains 19.8% variance and also shows clear difference between East/West positions (Figure 2.).

**Figure 2: East/West party positions on diversity**




Accordingly, our function tells us that party respondents have an exclusive definition of diversity, yet they do not expect much adaptation from immigrants, think of diversity as a normative goal and believe many groups can have legitimate claims.

### 11.2 Future direction of the EU

Turning to the next section on how different groups of parties see the future direction of EU integration, our discriminant analysis of party families along the six previously identified composite indexes results in two functions: the first explains 23.9% variation and the second 30.2%, making these relatively strong predictors (the second being stronger) (Figure 3.). Our first function would predict that respondent believe that the EU should become federalized in the future, there should be extensive EU rights granted, diversity is strengthened within and across countries by integration, but no groups should get rights from the EU. The second function is almost the opposite, it says respondents believe the EU policy should be decentralized and lesser institutionalized in the future, while parties would support many minority groups to get rights from the EU.

**Figure 3: Ideological party family positions on direction of EU**




On the first function right parties and social democrats have the most distant positions. There is a clear distinction among the party families, the two closest parties being the conservatives and regional parties. On the second function, the two most distant viewpoints are those of the regional and the right parties, and as the scores show there is very little difference between the positions assumed by left parties and conservatives, or conservatives and social democrats.

Running the discriminant analysis on the same issues but on the governmental and opposition group of parties, we only have a single function that predicts a relatively weak 13.1% of variation. The function predicts that party respondents do not believe the EU should give rights, but EU integration strengthens both diversity across and within the countries and


national identity and culture. The opposition and government parties are also taking distinct positions as reflected by our results (Figure 4.), although the distance relatively smaller than in previously observed analyses.

**Figure 4: Government/Opposition party positions on direction of EU**



Our analysis on East vs. West parties' attitude on the same issues also results in a single function that has explanatory power at 15.8%, about the same as the previous function. The function can be described as predicting respondents favoring decentralization and lesser institutionalization of the EU as a direction for the future of integration and no EU-level rights, no groups for these rights. The Eastern and Western parties also show that they have distinct stands on this function, as is reflected in Figure 5.

**Figure 5: East/West party positions on direction of EU**



### 11.3 Issues of citizenship

Turning to citizenship policies, our analysis reveals that ideological political party families distinguish themselves along a single function (Figure 6.), predicting 21.1% of variation. Thus, the function predicts that party respondents would support granting supranational EU citizenship without member-state citizenship but at the same time they would object to the same extent to allow for dual citizenship. Dispersion of party positions is clear: left parties define one extreme, while right parties define the other extreme, well fitting traditional expectations. We also observe a crowding around left parties as regional parties take a very similar position, followed closely by the social democrats, while on the other side of the continuum, the conservative are at considerable distance from the right parties.

**Figure 6: Ideological party family positions on citizenship**




When we turn to government and opposition positions, our discriminant analysis reveals yet again no function with explanatory power. The same is true trying to distinguish between positions of parties in the East and the West, which means that no distinction can be observed between government vs. opposition parties and East vs. West parties. As such, we are unable to separate between these groups of parties, which means that while ideology does play a role,

parties adopt positions on the issues of citizenship policy irrespective of their government status and geographic location within Europe.

#### 11.4 Free movement, migration, and asylum policy

Analyzing party positions on migration, free movement and asylum policy, our analysis reveals two functions (Figure 7.). The first function proves to be the strongest out of all of our analyses as it predicts 44.3%, i.e. about half the variation, while the second function is already much weaker, explaining only 10.4%. Accordingly, the first function says that most of the party respondents would restrict free movement to a large degree; they would not welcome group of immigrants, and would see asylum seekers as a problem for society. This in fact would be a very exclusionist understanding of the issues related to immigration – yet it seems to be the underlying characteristic for our respondents. The second function, which is a four times weaker predictor than the first function, is very similar to the original one, with one exception since it describes respondents as willing to grant extensive political rights for non-citizens, yet they would not welcome immigrants, and oppose preferential policies on migration.

**Figure 7: Ideological party family positions on migration**




On the first function, the two end-points are at a great distance from each other (our greatest separation in all discriminant analyses), and make the most striking distinction within our analysis between regional and right parties on the two extremes. At the same time, there is almost no separation between the position assumed by conservative and left parties – once again confirming the crowding thesis for mainstream parties, while the social democrats situate themselves somewhere between conservatives and right parties, though much closer to the conservative position than to the right party position. On the second function, the same conservatives and left parties are the most distant, while there is little difference between the

opinions of social democrats and right parties. Regional parties are at about the same distance from social democrats (or right parties) and the left parties.

Looking at the distribution of opposition vs. government parties, we find for the third time that government parties cannot be distinguished from the opposition parties in their positioning, which means government status has no effect on preferences on free movement or asylum policies parties have. The similar test for East/West parties results in a discriminant function that explains 11.5% of variation. The function can be described as respondents welcome groups of immigrants, which is more than twice as important as their support for some preferential migration policy and opposition to rights granted to non-citizens.


**Figure 8: East/West party positions on migration**



### 11.5 European enlargement

Analyzing party families positions on EU enlargement, we find four possible explanatory functions but only the first one explains 15.8% variation, the rest score below 6% and thus do not make part of our analysis. Thus, our single function shows that party respondents believe enlargement should have several conditions but the EU should not be enlarged, although enlargement is good for diversity and it helps the different minority groups. When we check for the distribution of party families along this function we get a mixed picture, as reflected by Figure 9.

**Figure 9: Ideological party family positions on enlargement**




As the figure shows, only the left and the right parties have more distinct positions on these issues, regional, conservative and social democrat parties crowd together and have almost identical positions that are somewhat closer to the position of left parties than right parties.

Checking the dimension of European enlargement against the two groups of government and opposition parties ends up with a function that does not explain even 1% of variation, thus government position is totally irrelevant for how parties position themselves towards EU enlargement. On the other hand, the similar analysis on the views of Eastern vs. Western parties on the same issue results in a function that predicts 16.4% of variation. Unlike in the case of party families, this function contains only two of the four possible composite indexes to describe the function, claiming respondents will favor few conditions for EU enlargement and an extensive enlargement of the EU (Figure 10.). Given the description of the function, it is little surprise that parties of the East and West have very different position:


**Figure 10: East/West party positions on enlargement**

### 11.6 European Public Sphere

Distinguishing party position on European communication and collaboration we find only one function to explain variance to a meaningful extent (Figure 11.). The function predicts party respondents would claim some sub-spaces of European communication exist, they would not think that these are exclusive, and have no interest in addressing European actors (the most important component) but rather civil society; although they claim they would welcome more trans-European collaboration and communication. The two most distinct positions are adopted yet again by the right parties and the left parties – supporting traditional cleavage theory, and again the position of social democrats and conservatives is the closest of all parties – seemingly confirming expectations for mainstream parties, while regional parties situate themselves at about the same distance from right parties than the conservatives.

**Figure 11: Ideological party family positions on EPS**

Analyzing the same issues related to the European public sphere, a relatively weak single function that predicts about 11.6% of variation between government and opposition parties can be discerned (Figure 12.). Nevertheless, we should underline that this is one of the few cases that government status matters for party positions. The function is claiming respondents think that the European public space is exclusive to a large degree, and they have very little interest in addressing civil society.

**Figure 12: Government/opposition party positions on EPS**

Examining Eastern parties vs. Western ones and we find that a single function (Figure 13.) – described as interest in addressing European institutions as well as civil society – predicts a relatively high 27.2% of variation, which is one of the highest scores observed for this grouping of parties. It is interesting to note that there is also a relatively larger separation between East and West parties than the one we have observed between opposition and government parties.

**Figure 13: East/West party positions on EPS**

Our most important finding that confirms our expectation is that parties position themselves on issues of EU integration, citizenship, immigration, or enlargement based on how exclusive their views of diversity are. We have shown that the exclusive definition of diversity figured prominently in all identified party positions on diversity (and the corresponding functions describing these positions) and party position seem to be in line with how exclusive this definition is. The future direction of the EU is the only dimension of EU politics where both distinctions between government/opposition parties and East/West seem to work and parties adopt distinguishable positions. Ideological background matters here as well, but parties do not adopt very distant positions, except for those on the right. The main dividing line among parties regarding citizenship issues is the question of dual citizenship that is considered much harder to accept than a hypothetical supranational citizenship of the EU. Similarly, on the issue of free movement division among parties is based on the restrictions of free movement and opposition to welcoming immigrant groups. At the same time EU enlargement proved to be the dimension where party positions are the weakest affected by the contextual factors of the parties, as only a very weak ideological distinction could be observed.

Counter to our expectations, our analysis of party positions has shown that parties assume positions on issues of diversity, citizenship, immigration or enlargement irrespective of whether they are part of the government or not, while the East/West separation is significant in what parties think about adaptation of immigrants, the normative value of diversity, and group claims. In fact, the government vs. opposition distinction proves significant only concerning positioning towards EPS and the future of EU direction; and even here is a relatively weak predictor, meaning government status affects little parties' willingness to participate in European affairs. The East/West distinction between the parties is also relatively weak for most of our analyses, except when it comes to positions about the EPS, where it is much stronger than the government/opposition divide, although one would expect more differentiation between parties who are in government and those in opposition than those in East vs. West, since it is the representatives of government parties that interact with European institutions. Instead we find that there is a much sharper distinction between East and West parties, which is seemingly due to the latter's interest in interacting with both European and civic actors.

The clearest distinction among positions on issues of diversity, the future of EU, immigration, and enlargement, as well as the EPS, is available among ideological party families, where most often the political space is defined by right parties and left parties as predicted by scholars arguing Europeanization is absorbed into traditional left-right cleavages. In this sense, our findings confirm that ideological background and traditional cleavages are the best predictors of party positions for all issues: diversity, EU politics, and the EPS. Yet there are a few exceptions, as we have seen regional minority parties have proven to represent very distinct positions when it comes to an exclusive understanding of diversity (confirming one's expectations), as well as social democrats vs. the conservatives in what is expected from immigrants with regards to adaptation. There are issues where conservatives also distinguish their preferences mostly against left parties – and migration policy is such, yet we could also observe that social democrats and conservatives have very close positions on most of the other issues – which given that mainstream parties are mostly in these two groups – seems to

confirm our expectations for mainstream parties assuming similar positions. This is especially true for the EPS, where the two mainstream party families take up stances in the center that are hardly distinguishable from each other, while the remaining party groups scatter around their position.

## 12 Predicting Party Position

Our prime goal in this report is to test the relationship among the different positions parties assume on issues of diversity and the EU polity and policies, as well as the European Public Sphere, which will be analyzed in the following section. We shall also examine if party positioning along our dimensions of EU politics will have any consequence on how parties think about communication spaces. We examine the relationships among these fields in order to be able to identify whether diversity view or positions on EU politics are good predictors for the development of the European Public Sphere. Having identified these, we can draw some preliminary conclusions about the role political parties across Europe play in the articulation of the public sphere and give some answers to how diversity contributes to this. Accordingly, we will be able not only to argue convincingly whether views of diversity of the political parties matter for party positions regarding European issues of immigration but we will also be able to establish whether European issues and policies affect parties' views about Europeanization understood as trans-European collaboration and communication.

We have run regression analysis on our composite indexes in order to examine the predictive power of diversity and EU politics party positions with regard to the EPS. The general purpose of multiple regressions is to learn more about the relationship between several independent variables and a dependent variable. Multiple regression procedures are very widely used in social science research because in general, multiple regression allows the researcher to identify what is the best predictor of his/her subject of inquiry. As such, we run multiple regression analysis in order to be able to say whether political party positions on issues of diversity predict positions on issues related to the EU or attitudes toward the EPS; and we also test hypotheses that opinions about the future direction of EU integration, citizenship policy, migration, free movement, and asylum policy or EU enlargement predict the willingness of political parties to become part of European communication and collaboration spaces.

For the regression analysis we use the same composite indexes that are created after factor analysis to represent opinions about diversity, the EU polity, and the EPS and are employed by discriminate analysis in the previous section. We test different predictive models by entering different sets of composite indexes as independent variables against different dependent variables. Multiple regression analysis tells us the predictive value of our model, whether the prediction is better than pure chance (significance) and it also shows us how well each of the independent variables predicts the dependent variables.

On a technical note this means that we first look for the predictive value of the model (adjusted R square) and whether our prediction is better than chance (the significance of F). If the significance is 0.10 or less, we consider the model significant, and we only look at models that predict at least 10% of variance of the dependent variable. Next we look at the individual variables and check whether these are 'significant' predictors by looking at the significance associated with each independent variable of the model. Please note that while in the social sciences a significance level of .05 is considered the standard and significance level between 0.05 and 0.10 marginal, we employ a less stringent understanding, setting the significance threshold at 0.10. All of the regression tables are provided in the following pages, meaningful R square values and significant scores are in bold, significance levels indicated by stars (\*\* -  $p < 0.05$ , \* -  $p < 0.10$ ).

The regression analysis of attitudes of political parties toward diversity and opinions about the future direction of European integration (Table 12.) has mixed results, as two of our composite indexes for the future of the EU, namely EU integration as increased decentralization and lesser institutionalization and EU integration strengthening national identity and culture show no relation to any party opinion related to diversity. At the same time, the analysis shows that views on diversity predict political party attitudes on the EU becoming a federation, yet the model would account only for 11% variation in the later. Looking at the coefficients it becomes clear that what matters is that parties support an inclusive definition of diversity, claim diversity has advantages and reject the disadvantages of diversity, and these three issues of diversity figure equally prominently in determining belief about the EU as federation.

**Table 12: The effect of diversity views on direction of EU integration**

		Direction of EU Integration					
		EU integration as more federalization	EU integration as decentralization and lesser	the scope of EU rights	EU strengthening national identity and culture	EU strengthening diversity within and across countries	the scope of EU rights groups
R Square		<b>0.118*</b>	.046	<b>0.200**</b>	-.037	<b>0.251**</b>	<b>0.134*</b>
Diversity Attitudes	degree of inclusiveness of the definition of diversity	<b>0.291*</b>	.056	.178	.404	<b>0.484**</b>	.221
	advantages of diversity	<b>0.263*</b>	-.131	.158	-.007	.152	.134
	disadvantages from diversity	<b>0.280*</b>	-.259	.193	-.161	-.152	-.083
	adaptation to diversity through separate institutions	.217	-.064	.291	-.041	.154	<b>0.417**</b>
	adaptation to diversity within existing institutions	-.036	.022	-.201	.139	.050	-.093
	degree of adaptation required	-.157	.159	-.194	.023	-.098	-.160
	diversity as normative goal	.102	-.209	<b>0.285**</b>	-.094	.050	.137
	the scope of minority claims	-.245	-.118	.007	-.135	.053	-.118

Opinions about diversity also predict whether political parties would support EU rights as the regression explains 20% variation of these views. Moreover, it is diversity seen as a normative goal alone that would predict party support for these rights. Issues of diversity also determine what political parties say about integration seen as benefiting diversity within and across the countries, more precisely, the degree of inclusiveness of the diversity definition explains 25.1% of variation. Our expectation that attitudes on diversity will determine what parties think about the extent of groups should receive EU-level rights is also confirmed as party support for adaptation through diversity through separate systems and institutions for the minorities predicts 13.4% of variation in the scope of groups to claim EU rights.

Analysis of political party attitudes toward diversity and their opinion regarding citizenship policy (Table 13.) reveals that more inclusive understandings of diversity will predict a more inclusive citizenship policy preference. Diversity attitudes explain 12.6% of the variation in the degree of inclusiveness of citizenship policy supported by the respondents. Moreover, our scores show that if parties support adaptation to diversity through separate

institutions for the minorities, they will also prefer an inclusive citizenship policy. Attitudes on diversity also determine 30.6% variation in support for dual citizenship, and yet again, support for inclusive definition of diversity is the most important determinant but adaptation through separate institution is a close second, while seeing diversity as advantageous and as a normative goal for society as well as opposition to group claims are of secondary order as is shown by our coefficient scores. Last but not least, regression scores show that party attitudes on diversity explain 21.7% variation in the support for granting EU citizenship without citizenship of a member state, more precisely, politicians that would support a high degree of adaptation required from immigrants are likely to support granting a supranational EU citizenship.

**Table 13: The effect of diversity views on citizenship policy**

		Immigration Issues		
		inclusiveness of citizenship policy	support for dual citizenship	support for supranational EU citizenship
Diversity issues	Adjusted R Square	<b>0.126*</b>	<b>0.306**</b>	<b>0.217**</b>
	degree of inclusiveness of the definition of diversity	-.170	<b>0.494**</b>	.017
	advantages of diversity	-.218	<b>0.223*</b>	.000
	disadvantages from diversity	.113	-.057	.199
	adaptation to diversity through separate institutions	<b>0.559**</b>	<b>0.399**</b>	-.155
	adaptation to diversity within existing institutions	-.119	-.346	.272
	degree of adaptation required	.079	-.077	<b>0.321**</b>
	diversity as normative goal	.112	<b>0.274**</b>	.030
	the scope of minority claims	-.171	<b>-0.272*</b>	.126

When it comes to free movement, mobility and asylum policy, once again the diversity opinion of parties is important for predicting their views on these EU policies (Table 14.). Party views on diversity predict 13.2% variation of the support for restrictions of free movement, and out of our diversity indexes what matters most is how many groups with legitimate claims parties identify and second, what degree of adaptation they require from immigrants. 18.5% variation in what political rights would parties support for non-citizens is explained by their views on diversity, namely whether they have an inclusive definition of diversity, and think of diversity as a normative goal, and identify diversity as having advantages for society, while they oppose minority groups to make claims.

**Table 14: The effect of diversity views on free movement**

		Immigration Issues				
		degree of restrictions on free movement	scope of political rights for non-citizens	scope of welcome groups	preferential policies on free movement	asylum restrictions
Diversity issues	Adjusted R Square	<b>0.132*</b>	<b>0.186**</b>	.102	.015	<b>0.150**</b>
	degree of inclusiveness of the definition of diversity	-.156	<b>0.388**</b>	.216	.239	.079
	advantages of diversity	-.190	<b>0.240*</b>	.149	-.183	-.103
	disadvantages from diversity	.160	-.108	-.007	-.204	<b>0.402**</b>
	adaptation to diversity through separate institutions	-.154	.309	-.119	-.202	-.236
	adaptation to diversity within existing institutions	.030	-.026	.080	.349	.294
	degree of adaptation required	<b>0.220*</b>	-.053	.166	-.167	-.012
	diversity as normative goal	-.186	<b>0.222*</b>	.136	.063	-.106
	the scope of minority claims	<b>0.093**</b>	<b>-0.304*</b>	.230	-.100	-.063

Nevertheless, diversity views of the parties are not good predictors when it comes to predicting opinions about welcomed groups of immigrants as our regression model is not significant, furthermore our diversity variables also show multicollinearity and thus no individual predictors can be established. A similar problem emerges for predicting support for preferential treatment in free movement and migration policy based on diversity views, our model is yet again unable to explain variance and is not significant, while individual variables show yet again multicollinearity. Our model of diversity views predicting opinions about migration and asylum policy regains explanatory power only when it addresses the issue of asylum seekers. Accordingly, 15% of variation in whether parties see asylum seekers as a problem is explained by the parties thinking diversity has mainly disadvantages for society.

The situation is very different when it comes to the relationship between diversity views of the political parties and their opinion about EU enlargement (Table 15.). Our regression model tells that diversity views explain a relatively large 38.5% of variation in opinions about what should be the conditions of enlargement, where an inclusive definition diversity is the most important single predictor, while opposition to separate minority institution and an expectation for adaptation on part of the immigrants are of secondary importance. Nevertheless, views on diversity do not predict the extent of EU enlargement envisioned by the party respondents or whether they see enlargement as benefiting diversity – and as such, to what extent it benefits diversity, as all three regression models have no explanatory power and are not significant, while individual variables show multicollinearity and thus are indeterminable.

**Table 15: The effect of diversity views on EU enlargement**

		EU Enlargement			
		scope of enlargement conditions	extent of EU enlargement	diversity benefits of enlargement	scope of groups benefited by enlargement
Adjusted R Square		<b>.385</b>	.045	-.024	-.076
Diversity Attitudes	degree of inclusiveness of the definition of diversity	<b>0.461**</b>	.277	.018	-.193
	advantages of diversity	.030	.068	-.092	-.029
	disadvantages from diversity	.065	.166	.039	.055
	adaptation to diversity through separate institutions	<b>-0.296*</b>	-.067	.005	.038
	adaptation to diversity within existing institutions	.199	.056	.056	.127
	degree of adaptation required	<b>0.248*</b>	-.200	.123	-.175
	diversity as normative goal	.144	.143	.163	.094
	the scope of minority claims	.138	-.012	.223	.074

In contrast, party views on issues of diversity are the most important predictors for support of European communication spaces (Table 16.), as diversity views of the parties explain about half (49.5%) of the variation in the extent parties believe in the existence of European communication spaces. Looking for individual factors, our data shows that the degree of inclusiveness of the definition of diversity has an outstanding effect on the support for European communication spaces that is four times larger than the effect of beliefs that object to diversity having disadvantages, which is our second most important predictor. Diversity views have a much weaker predictive power (14.7%) on how much exclusion from the European public sphere parties will claim is there. What is more important is that the same individual predictors can be observed as in the previous model: the inclusiveness of the definition of diversity political and parties' rejection of the disadvantages of diversity. Nevertheless, in the present model the two individual predictors are on an equal footing in their importance unlike in the previous case.

**Table 16: The effect of diversity views on the EPS**

		European public spheres				
		extent of European comm. space	degree of exclusion from EPS	interest in addressing European institutions	interest in addressing civil society	More possibilities for colab. and comm...
diversity issues	Adjusted R Square	<b>0.495**</b>	<b>0.147**</b>	-.018	-.067	<b>0.314**</b>
	degree of inclusiveness of the definition of diversity	<b>0.808**</b>	<b>0.481**</b>	.072	.077	.193
	advantages of diversity	.078	.015	-.017	.117	.184
	disadvantages from diversity	<b>-0.262**</b>	<b>-0.348**</b>	.004	.035	-.020
	adaptation to diversity through separate institutions	.026	.034	.180	.141	<b>0.299*</b>
	adaptation to diversity within existing institutions	.004	.130	.145	-.078	.150
	degree of adaptation required	.030	.146	.043	-.083	.033
	diversity as normative goal	.122	.144	-.088	.100	<b>0.269**</b>
	the scope of minority claims	-.120	-.137	.094	.091	-.057

Notwithstanding the above noted important role of views of diversity play in predicting support for European deliberation and views on how exclusive European public spaces might be, diversity positions do not affect parties' interest in addressing either European actors or civil society actors. However, a relatively large 31.4% of the variation of whether parties would welcome further European communication and collaboration opportunities is once again predicted by these views, confirming our expectation that parties with more inclusive views of diversity would welcome more collaboration in the EU. What is interesting is that our previous individual predictors of diversity attitudes lose significance in this model and it is diversity perceived as a normative goal and the belief in the adaptation of publics through separate institutions for minorities that will predict the extent to which parties would welcome further opportunities for trans-European collaboration and collaboration.

Having examined the impact of party views of diversity on what parties think of different aspects of the EU or the EPS, let us now turn our attention to the relationship between how party opinions about the EU polity and EU policies might affect party support for the EPS and party willingness to participate in European communication and collaboration. In the following pages we run multiple regression analysis to see whether party positions on the future direction of EU, citizenship policy, free movement, migration, and asylum policy, or EU enlargement have any predictive power for parties' positions regarding the EPS. Accordingly, we will be able not only to argue convincingly whether views of diversity of the political parties matter for party positions regarding the EPS but we will also be able to establish whether European issues and policies are more important predictors of these positions than views of diversity.

Our analysis of the effect of the future direction of the EU on parties' assessment of European communication spaces (Table 17.) shows that opinions about the future direction of the EU matter in predicting 21.9% of variation in parties' views on how extensive European communication spaces are, and the regression model only predicts a single predictor – that being party support for the view that the EU is strengthening national identity and culture. In a similar way, views about the future direction of the EU predict 13% of variation of the parties' views on how exclusive European communication spaces are. Individual coefficients show that the strongest predictor of the model is how many minority groups are seen by the

parties to be the legitimate holders of EU rights, while the view that the EU strengthens national identity and culture is the individual predictor with secondary importance.

**Table 17: The effect of EU future direction on EPS**

		European public spheres				
		extent of European comm. space	degree of exclusion from EPS	interest in addressing European institutions	interest in addressing civil society	more possibilities for colab. and comm.
EU future direction	Adjusted R Square	<b>0.219**</b>	<b>0.130**</b>	<b>0.164**</b>	<b>0.336**</b>	-.016
	EU integration as more federalization	.078	.090	<b>-0.239*</b>	-.179	.166
	EU integration as decentralization and lesser institutionalization	.096	.163	-.023	-.104	-.176
	the scope of EU rights	.117	-.114	<b>0.247*</b>	<b>0.286**</b>	.257
	EU strengthening national identity and culture	<b>0.335**</b>	<b>0.250*</b>	.056	<b>-0.207*</b>	.059
	EU strengthening diversity within and across countries	.191	.052	.202	<b>0.243*</b>	-.074
	the scope of EU rights groups	.235	<b>0.389**</b>	.218	<b>0.288**</b>	-.092

While diversity views of the parties proved irrelevant for predicting their willingness to address European actors, their views about the future of the EU can predict 16.4% variation in the level of this willingness. Our model predicts that parties who oppose the future direction of the EU seen as federalization and believe there should be extensive rights the EU should be able to grant are most likely to be interested in addressing European level actors. Interestingly enough, party views about the future of the EU have a doubled predictive power for willingness to address civil society actors (33.6%), as the model suggests that parties that believe equally in EU rights, the EU strengthening diversity within and across countries, and support many groups to possess EU rights, while they oppose seeing the EU as strengthening national identity and culture, are most likely to be addressing civil society actors. Last but not least, our model is not significant, thus party views on the future of the EU do not matter for their support for more possibilities of trans-European collaboration and communication.

Turning to the question of how party opinions about citizenship might affect party support for the EPS and party willingness to participate in European communication and collaboration (Table 18.), we show that support for dual citizenship is a single predictor for 20.3% of variation in how political parties judge the extensiveness of European public spaces. Nevertheless, party views on citizenship cannot predict whether these deliberative spaces are judged exclusive or not by the parties, and explain only 16.2% of parties' interest in addressing European level actors. As the model shows, parties that support granting EU citizenship without member-state citizenship and at the same time reject inclusive citizenship policy are the ones who will address European actors. In contrast to this, our model is not significant for predicting parties' interest in addressing civil society actors. At the same time, our most interesting finding is that citizenship issues predict a relatively high 32.8% of the

support for more opportunities for trans-European communication and collaboration, and our model shows that parties that support primarily supranational EU citizenship and dual citizenship will be the parties to be interested in further trans-European communication and collaboration, which yet again confirms that inclusionist parties are the ones ready for trans-European affairs.

**Table 18: The effect of citizenship on the prospects of EPS**

		European public spheres				
		extent of European comm. space	degree of exclusion from EPS	interest in addressing European institutions	interest in addressing civil society	more possibilities for colab. and comm.
citizenship	Adjusted R Square	<b>0.203**</b>	.038	<b>0.162**</b>	.113	<b>0.328**</b>
	inclusiveness of citizenship policy	-.089	-.053	<b>-0.313**</b>	<b>-0.349</b>	.140
	support for dual citizenship	<b>.497</b>	.306	.123	.189	<b>0.508**</b>
	support for supranational EU citizenship	-.079	.002	<b>0.286**</b>	.121	<b>0.295**</b>

In a similar matter, issues related to the free movement of people also affect parties' willingness to participate in more trans-European communication and collaboration (Table 19.). Support for political rights for non-citizens and the number of welcome groups predicts 18.2% of the variation in parties' belief in the existence of European spaces of communication and collaboration. Exactly the same two individual predictors with almost identical weights of importance account also for 20.5% variance in party attitudes on how exclusive these communication spaces are, meaning that party preferences on free movement policy explain simultaneously about a fifth of what parties say about the existence and the exclusive nature of European public spaces.

**Table 19: The effect of free movement on the prospects of EPS**

		European public spheres				
		extent of European comm. space	degree of exclusion from EPS	interest in addressing European institutions	interest in addressing civil society	more possibilities for colab. and comm.
Free movement	Adjusted R Square	<b>0.182*</b>	<b>0.205**</b>	<b>0.283**</b>	<b>0.365**</b>	<b>0.188**</b>
	degree of restrictions on free movement	.021	.244	.083	-.150	<b>0.342**</b>
	scope of political rights for non-citizens	<b>0.364**</b>	<b>0.391**</b>	.126	.109	<b>0.495**</b>
	scope of welcomed groups	<b>0.224*</b>	<b>0.226*</b>	<b>0.469**</b>	<b>0.495**</b>	.169
	preferential policies on free movement	.159	.167	.097	<b>0.219*</b>	-.031
	asylum restrictions	-.023	-.064	.154	.179	-.180

As such, it seems that what matters most is how many immigrant groups parties would welcome, as party choice on the scope of welcome immigrant groups is the single predictor for 28.3% party interest in addressing European level actors. More than a third (36.5%) of interest of addressing civil society actors is also explained by the same views, though a second predictor, with half the weight of importance, can also be identified as being party support for preferential policies on free movement for some groups. The only aspect of the

EPS, which is unaffected by what choices parties have regarding immigrant groups is whether political parties would welcome more possibilities for trans-European collaboration and communication – a somewhat unexpected finding as we would expect that parties welcoming immigrants would also welcome more trans-European deliberation. It is party choices of restrictions of free movement and granted political rights for non-citizens that predicts 18.8% variation in party response on this question.

Examining the relationship between party views on European enlargement and the EPS (Table 20.), our model states the party opinions about EU enlargement can predict neither their views on the common European spaces of communication and collaboration nor their position whether these spaces would be exclusive or not as the relationships prove to be not significant statistically. At the same time, one third of the variation in the interest of the parties to address European actors is predicted by their views on EU enlargement; more precisely parties that associate diversity benefits to enlargement are predicted to be interested in addressing EU level actors. Similarly, a relatively high 38.4% of the interest of the political parties to address civil society actors is explained by the same belief that enlargement benefits diversity and the support for an extensive enlargement of the EU. Notwithstanding these models with relatively high predictive power, party opinions about enlargement cannot tell whether parties would welcome additional opportunities for trans-European communication as the model is not significant in this case.

**Table 20: The effect of EU enlargement on the prospects of EPS**

		European public spheres				
		extent of European comm. space	degree of exclusion from EPS	interest in addressing European institutions	interest in addressing civil society	more possibilities for colab. and comm.
EU enlargement	Adjusted R Square	.065	0.128**	<b>0.333**</b>	<b>0.384**</b>	.010
	scope of enlargement conditions	.185	.055	.146	.002	.078
	extent of EU enlargement	.003	-.218	.156	<b>0.255*</b>	-.228
	diversity benefits of enlargement	.246	<b>0.523**</b>	<b>0.418**</b>	<b>0.435*</b>	.283
	scope of groups benefitted by enlargement	-.084	.040	.062	.119	.155

To conclude, it is important to note that party positions on diversity issues do have an effect not only on the positions parties take in regards of the EU polity and policies but also the European Public Sphere. In fact, our strongest predictive model is that which explains about half of the extent of the European communication and collaboration spaces envisioned by the political parties with their position on diversity, more precisely their inclusive definition of diversity that would object to associating disadvantages to diversity. The same conditions will also predict what parties think of the inclusiveness of the European Public Sphere, and party views of diversity are strong predictors for parties being eager to look for additional opportunities for trans-European collaboration and cooperation.

Party views on diversity also have a strong effect on what positions parties will assume with regards to the EU strengthening national identity and culture, support for dual and

supranational citizenship, and the scope of enlargement conditions, meaning that the perspective of diversity of the political parties will affect what parties think about the future direction of the EU, citizenship policy, and enlargement, meaning that the perspective of diversity will affect what parties think about trans-border loyalties that are subject of debate across Europe. Furthermore, besides the already mentioned inclusive definition of diversity that is the most prominent, thinking of diversity as a normative goal for society and accepting that adaptation to diversity can happen through separate institutions for the minorities are aspects that turn out as significant predictors several times in our analysis.

Nevertheless, there are several aspects of diversity that seem to have no or little effect on our subjects. For example, adaptation to diversity within the existing institutions does not score on any dimension, and it seems relatively unimportant how much adaptation would be required from immigrants, or the scope of minority claims accepted by the parties – which contradicts expectations of multicultural scholars. At the same time, we find that diversity views cannot predict whether parties would welcome immigrant groups or whether they would opt for preferential policies of free movement, which is counter to our expectations that more inclusive views of diversity will result in welcoming more immigrants to Europe.

Party views on the different policies and aspects of the EU will also have important ramifications for party positions about the EPS. We have shown that party views about the future direction of the EU predict party positions in four out of our five measures of the EPS. Interestingly enough, each of our measures of party positions on free movement, migration and asylum policy turns out to be a good predictor of party positions on the EPS, i.e. immigration issues are important for determining trans-European collaboration and communication. The unexpected result is that support for dual and supranational citizenship predicts a third of the variation on parties' willingness to embrace further opportunities for trans-European cooperation and collaboration. As such, diversity attitudes and citizenship preferences of the parties each determine a third of the variation for party support of the EPS. At the same time, unsurprisingly, parties' interest in addressing European-level actors is affected (though to various degree) by their views on both citizenship and free movement policy. Furthermore, party positions on free movement are responsible for about a third of the variation in parties' interest to engage civil society actors, which might suggest that we do not witness only a bottom-up version of Europeanization when parties would bring their domestic context to the European level but we see European issues transcending back to the domestic level actors. Accordingly, one can claim that issues such as the extent of enlargement, the diversity benefits of enlargement, preferential policies for migration for some groups, welcome immigrant groups, strengthening diversity within and across countries, the scope of EU rights groups or the scope of EU rights are all issues that make parties seek out the civil society actors on the domestic level.

### **13 Conclusions and Discussion**

Our extensive database enables us to identify the main sociological characteristics of politicians that were part of our sample, and we have outlined their common characteristics. Our very first exercise to identify commonalities among responses has told us what are the most significant and common positions regarding diversity issues in domestic politics and what are the most contested issues of European politics. Our common factors also tell us what our politicians understand by 'Europe' and what the different EU institutions and policies mean for the national political elite, as well as how they perceive the prospects of trans-European deliberation. As such, we have mapped out the different attitudes politicians across Europe have towards diversity, European politics, and trans-European collaboration and

cooperation – although at the present we are unable to identify the motives of their commitment.

We have outlined the most important dimensions for each of these concepts earlier and we shall not repeat these here, but we want to underline that these are issues that proved significant for parties all across Europe. As such, they are not only part of domestic discourses but they constitute significant common European themes that are contested in all countries of the continent. In turn, European-level discussion of these issues in different European countries could enable national political actors to carry European ideas into their national public spheres.

Based upon our results, we claim that political parties play an important role in the articulation of the EPS since they aggregate domestic preferences, which then are important predictors of their behavior on the European level on the one hand, and they transmit important European issues and policies back to the domestic civil society actors as shown by our analysis. We have claimed that maintaining multiple contextual identities is crucial for political parties in dealing with diversity, EU politics or European public spheres and our most important finding is that the party views on EU politics and trans-European collaboration depend to a significant extent on diversity preferences that the parties have.

This means that national contexts are important determinants for the integration of Europe and the prospects of the EPS. Yet, diversity views are much stronger predictors of party choice on citizenship policy than that of free-movement policy, which might be due to the fact that citizenship policy is much more in the competence of national governments than free movement policy governed by EU directives. This further underlines the importance of the political context and the policy area in question as context of identity formation that play a decisive role in determining attitudes. We claim that if a party is opposed to an inclusive understanding of diversity, and cosmopolitanism in general, it will most likely oppose immigration as well as European deliberation. Similarly, attitudes towards EU politics also affect substantially interest in trans-European deliberation thus parties with more inclusive views of citizenship, immigration, or enlargement are more likely to be active participants in European arenas, which might prove a new potential for reaching common attitudes and preferences across the different member states,.

We have also outlined the process through which European issues reverberate to the domestic level, thus showing that the Europe and European issues play a role in domestic party competition. Additionally, our individual party respondents have testified that Europeanization has penetrated into the domestic political systems since issues such as immigration, adaptation of immigrants, the inclusiveness of citizenship criteria, also figure prominently in domestic political discourse and as such in the responses of party respondents. It might be too early to claim that Europeanization in itself is a new dimension in party competition as most of this competition is absorbed into existing cleavages – mainly the neo-liberal/regulated capitalism axis, but it is undeniable that these issues are gaining significance.

Employing party groupings in our analysis, we have also examined how the different party actors position themselves on the dimensions of diversity, EU politics and EPS. We show that ideological party family membership is the most powerful predictor of party positions across all issues studied. This tells us that at the present, party positions are largely dependent on traditional cleavages, i.e. most specifically the left/right divide. In contrast, the distinction between government and opposition parties proved irrelevant in most aspects, although theory would predict more inclusive and pro-European attitudes for governmental parties. Even more surprising is that we do not find significant difference between government and opposition parties regarding willingness to participate in trans-European communication and collaboration, although one would expect governmental responsibilities on the European level would result in a concrete difference between these.

Furthermore, we have found only some evidence to the claim that there is a difference in the Europeanization of political parties in Eastern and Western Europe, except the case of enlargement of the EU, where Eastern parties turned out to hold very different positions than their Western counterparts. In other aspects this division is weak in its predictive power, which is somewhat unexpected, as East parties are in fact the newest members of trans-European communication and cooperation and one would expect them to be interested in increasing their role in deliberation. At the same time, mainstream parties are less likely to occupy outlier positions, confirming theoretical propositions that would claim mainstream parties represent positions in the center. Instead, the maverick parties are likely to exploit these issues and position themselves on the extremes of the continuum as they hope to mobilize electorate with these appeals.

Political parties play an important role in the articulation of the EPS since they aggregate domestic preferences and attitudes on diversity, which then are important predictors of their choice of EU politics and their behavior in the European arena. On the other hand, Europeanization seems to have penetrated the domestic political systems since issues such as the extent of enlargement, the diversity benefits of enlargement, preferential policies for migration for some groups, welcome immigrant groups, strengthening diversity within and across countries, the scope of EU rights groups or the scope of EU rights figure prominently in domestic political discourses across the continent. Diversity views will determine which claims political parties will accept into their public discourses, not only on the domestic but the European level, too. In this sense, parties convey the domestic onto the European level on the one hand, but on the other they transmit important European issues and policies back to the domestic civil society actors given the interconnectedness and mutual exchange among various national public spheres. It is the nature of the national public spheres and domestic political competition and cleavages that will determine whether national collective identities and loyalties will prevail, whether national publics are willing and able to be more open to transnationalization or Europeanization efforts.

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## **Appendix 1: Eurosphere Elite Interview Questions**

The interview guide authored by Monika Mokre, Hakan G Sicakkan and Veit Bader is available at:

[http://eurospheres.org/files/2010/09/Eurosphere\\_Research\\_Note\\_30\\_Mokre\\_Sicakkan\\_Bader.pdf](http://eurospheres.org/files/2010/09/Eurosphere_Research_Note_30_Mokre_Sicakkan_Bader.pdf)

## Appendix 2: Factor Analysis Results

### Sources of Diversity

	Component		
	1	2	3
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Social Class	.324	<b>.523</b>	.285
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Disability groups	.368	<b>.501</b>	.337
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Gender groups (men/women)	.237	<b>.694</b>	.142
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Generation (e.g., youth/elderly)	.381	<b>.591</b>	.007
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Global belonging groups (humanity)	<b>.828</b>	.252	.063
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: European belonging (with the EU)	<b>.837</b>	.255	.049
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Ethnic groups	.092	<b>.671</b>	-.181
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Ideological groups	<b>.604</b>	.438	.091
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Life-style groups	<b>.687</b>	.284	-.216
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Migrant groups	<b>.582</b>	.105	.064
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Multiple/mixed belongings	<b>.824</b>	.221	.050
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: National belonging	.400	<b>.432</b>	-.185
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Religious groups	.220	<b>.660</b>	.002
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Sexuality groups	.275	<b>.700</b>	.058
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Shifting belongings	<b>.864</b>	.230	.030
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Territorial belonging	<b>.582</b>	.242	.127
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Transnational belonging	<b>.850</b>	.267	.106
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Cultural groups	-.098	.218	<b>.740</b>
V1.1 Groups relevant for defining diverse society?: Language groups	-.211	.310	<b>-.516</b>

### Normative Value of Diversity

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
V2.1 What do you think about ethno-nationally diverse societies?: Question not answered	-.005	<b>.972</b>	-.069	-.066
V2.1 What do you think about ethno-nationally diverse societies?: The respondent sees ethno-nationally diverse society as desirable goal to achieve	<b>-.835</b>	-.302	-.255	-.220
V2.1 What do you think about ethno-nationally diverse societies?: The respondent sees ethno-nationally diverse society as an ontological matter without which society's and/or individual's existence would not be possible (as a condition for the society's and	-.007	-.064	<b>.981</b>	-.023
V2.1 What do you think about ethno-nationally diverse societies?: The respondent does not attribute any normative or ontological status to ethno-national diversity but sees ethno-national diversity as an inescapable fact of the social life which everybody h	<b>.842</b>	-.305	-.263	-.178
V2.1 The respondent does not attribute any normative or ontological status to ethno-national diversity but sees ethno-national diversity as an inescapable fact of the social life which everybody has to relate to no matter what they think about diversity	.016	-.058	-.021	<b>.987</b>

### Advantages of Diversity

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
V2.2a Diversity advantage?: Diversity makes it easy to avoid a homogenizing social cohesion	.087	.118	.030	<b>.721</b>
V2.2a Diversity advantage?: Diversity makes it easy to avoid a centralizing political unity	.191	.219	<b>.649</b>	.130
V2.2a Diversity advantage?: Diversity makes it easy to create a self-reflective national identity	.192	-.125	.257	<b>.672</b>
V2.2a Diversity advantage?: Diversity makes it easy to create new types of solidarity	.083	-.010	<b>.563</b>	.096
V2.2a Diversity advantage?: Diversity makes it easy to achieve individual autonomy	.029	.214	.044	<b>.446</b>
V2.2a Diversity advantage?: Diversity makes it easy to achieve equality of citizens before the law	.041	<b>.718</b>	.362	.154
V2.2a Diversity advantage?: Diversity makes it easy to achieve gender equality	-.070	.112	<b>.776</b>	.001
V2.2a Diversity advantage?: Diversity makes it easy to achieve a more mobile society	<b>.576</b>	.245	.176	.239
V2.2a Diversity advantage?: Diversity makes it easy to achieve a more free society	.218	<b>.779</b>	-.023	.143
V2.2a Diversity advantage?: Diversity makes it easy to achieve a more dynamic society	<b>.677</b>	.060	.003	.130
V2.2a Diversity advantage?: Diversity makes it easy to create a society with less rigid identity	<b>.549</b>	.150	-.012	.315
V2.2a Diversity advantage?: Diversity makes it easy be an economically successful society	<b>.707</b>	-.063	.073	-.388
V2.2a Diversity advantage?: Diversity makes it easy to have a society adapted to globalization	<b>.574</b>	.036	.071	.051
V2.2a Diversity advantage?: Diversity makes it easy to create a more just society	.041	<b>.754</b>	.078	.020

### Disadvantages of Diversity

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
V2.2b Diversity Disadvantage?:Diversity makes it difficult to achieve social cohesion	.133	<b>.741</b>	-.079	.017
V2.2b Diversity Disadvantage?:Diversity makes it difficult to achieve political unity	-.079	<b>.457</b>	-.008	.098
V2.2b Diversity Disadvantage?:Diversity makes it difficult to create a national identity	-.155	<b>.469</b>	-.112	.069
V2.2b Diversity Disadvantage?:Diversity makes it difficult to create solidarity	<b>.424</b>	.045	-.087	.027
V2.2b Diversity Disadvantage?:Diversity makes it difficult to achieve individual autonomy	<b>.797</b>	.105	.037	-.084
V2.2b Diversity Disadvantage?:Diversity makes it difficult to achieve equality before the law	-.037	.207	<b>.561</b>	-.089
V2.2b Diversity Disadvantage?:Diversity makes it difficult to achieve gender equality	.136	<b>.695</b>	.162	-.062
V2.2b Diversity Disadvantage?:Diversity makes it difficult to create a more free society	.016	.009	<b>.646</b>	-.011
V2.2b Diversity Disadvantage?:Diversity makes it difficult to create a more dynamic society	.015	-.125	.005	-.024
V2.2b Diversity Disadvantage?:Diversity makes it difficult to create a society with less rigid identity	<b>.837</b>	-.022	-.039	.149
V2.2b Diversity Disadvantage?:Diversity makes it difficult to achieve an economically more successful society	-.118	.096	-.062	<b>.714</b>
V2.2b Diversity Disadvantage?:Diversity makes it difficult to fight globalization	.226	-.102	-.015	<b>.771</b>
V2.2b Diversity Disadvantage?:Diversity makes it difficult to create a more just society	-.078	.126	.364	<b>.413</b>
V2.2b Diversity Disadvantage?:Diversity can lead to social and cultural tensions	.002	-.198	<b>.668</b>	.015
V2.2b Diversity Disadvantage?:Makes it difficult to agree on a common basis	.103	-.099	-.111	-.069
V2.2b Diversity Disadvantage?:Diversity makes conflicts in general	-.074	-.025	.043	-.039

### Regulation of Diversity

	Component	
	1	2
V2.3 Should questions of ethno-national diversity be regulated by the state? : 1. The state should be neutral with regard to ethno-nationally diverse groups	.096	<b>.757</b>
V2.3 Should questions of ethno-national diversity be regulated by the state? : 2. The state should treat all individual citizens equally before law irrespectively of their ethno-national affiliations	.208	<b>.735</b>
V2.3 Should questions of ethno-national diversity be regulated by the state? : 3. ONLY individuals can have rights, and ethno-national groups need NOT have specific group rights	.003	<b>.814</b>
V2.3 Should questions of ethno-national diversity be regulated by the state? : 4. Ethno-national groups should have group-specific rights	<b>.881</b>	.087
V2.3 Should questions of ethno-national diversity be regulated by the state? : 5. There should be exemptions from the law for ethno-national minorities	<b>.728</b>	.322
V2.3 Should questions of ethno-national diversity be regulated by the state? : 6. There should be special support measures for ethno-national minorities, e.g. subsidies or positive action programs	<b>.762</b>	-.016

### Minority Institutions

	Component		
	1	2	3
V2.4a Ethno-national groups have the right to own political institutions?: Groups and individuals within society should be allowed to organize according to their interests/identifications	<b>.668</b>	.194	-.214
V2.4a Ethno-national groups have the right to own political institutions?: Political institutions of ethno-national groups should be subsidized by the state	.312	<b>.758</b>	-.087
V2.4a Ethno-national groups have the right to own political institutions?: The political system should guide minority institutions to adapt to new developments of ethno-national group	.086	<b>.886</b>	.051
V2.4a Ethno-national groups have the right to own political institutions?: Ethno-national diversity groups should NOT have rights to have their own institutions	-.205	.193	<b>.830</b>
V2.4b Which minorities should be allowed to have which institutions?: Ethno-national groups in this country should be allowed to have their own collective interest associations	<b>.773</b>	.080	-.132
V2.4b Which minorities should be allowed to have which institutions?: Ethno-national groups in this country should be allowed to have their own political parties	<b>.822</b>	.023	-.145
V2.4b Which minorities should be allowed to have which institutions?: Ethno-national groups in this country should be allowed to have their own party groups in the national parliament	<b>.687</b>	.402	.167
V2.4b Which minorities should be allowed to have which institutions?: Ethno-national groups in this country should be allowed to have their own local, regional parliaments, if they are concentrated territorially	<b>.617</b>	.408	.172
V2.4b Which minorities should be allowed to have which institutions?: Groups should NOT have their own institutions.	.013	-.154	<b>.895</b>

### How diversity should be handled

	Component		
	1	2	3
V2.5 Public institutions adapted to ethno-national minorities?: Public institutions should not be adapted to meet the requirements of ethno-national minorities	.041	-.048	<b>-.673</b>
V2.5 Public institutions adapted to ethno-national minorities?: Public institutions should be made multi-lingual in order to communicate with all minorities	.412	-.029	<b>.480</b>
V2.5 Public institutions adapted to ethno-national minorities?: There should be multi-cultural education for public service functionaries	.309	.112	<b>.595</b>
V2.5 Public institutions adapted to ethno-national minorities?: Political parties should adopt new nomination procedures which obliges them to nominate a quota of minority/women	<b>.415</b>	.141	.141
V2.5 Public institutions adapted to ethno-national minorities?: "Substantial" political representation system, where representation is based on group belonging, should be adopted	-.001	<b>.824</b>	.048
V2.5 Public institutions adapted to ethno-national minorities?: There should be a possibility for founding separate hospitals and elderly houses for ethno-national minorities	<b>.789</b>	-.128	.092
V2.5 Public institutions adapted to ethno-national minorities?: There should be parallel political systems, like verzuiling in the Netherlands	<b>.669</b>	.363	-.105
V2.5 Public institutions adapted to ethno-national minorities?: Minorities should have their own sub-parliaments, representative bodies, and sub-governments.	.120	<b>.823</b>	.014
V2.5 Public institutions adapted to ethno-national minorities?: Public institutions principally should be adapted to meet the requirements of the ethno.-national minorities	-.014	.013	.002
V2.5 Public institutions adapted to ethno-national minorities?: There should be quota for minority representatives in the politic institutions	-.164	-.080	<b>.603</b>
V2.5 Public institutions adapted to ethno-national minorities?: Adapting the public institutions for the different religious practices (e.g. praying room, special menu, etc..)	-.058	-.004	-.019
V2.5 Public institutions adapted to ethno-national minorities?: Right to same-sex doctor	-.031	-.025	.036

### **Criteria of Citizenship**

V4.1a Criteria for citizenship? Acquisition of citizenship should not be automatic for any foreigners or their children; it should be at state discretion to grant citizenship based on certain criteria

V4.1a Criteria for citizenship? Children of all immigrant parents should automatically become citizens if one of the child's parents is a naturalized citizen, even if that child is born outside the country

V4.1a Criteria for citizenship? Children of all immigrant parents should automatically become citizens if these children are born in this country, even if their parents are not citizens in this country

V4.1a Criteria for citizenship? All immigrants who have lived legally in this country for a certain length of time should automatically be become citizens no matter which country they come from

### State discretion in citizenship

	Component				
	1	2	3	4	5
V4.1b If option 1 (state discretion) is amongst the alternatives chosen in 4.1a, specify the conditions for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship:It should be easier for co-ethnics to acquire citizenship	.662	.364	-.001	-.005	-.004
V4.1b If option 1 (state discretion) is amongst the alternatives chosen in 4.1a, specify the conditions for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship:It should be easier to acquire citizenship for foreigners whose mother tongue is the same as the language of	.724	.408	-.003	-.008	-.007
V4.1b If option 1 (state discretion) is amongst the alternatives chosen in 4.1a, specify the conditions for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship:It should be easier to acquire citizenship for foreigners whose religion is the same as the religion of this	-.001	.835	-.008	-.014	-.014
V4.1b If option 1 (state discretion) is amongst the alternatives chosen in 4.1a, specify the conditions for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship:It should be easier to acquire citizenship for foreigners who culture is the same as the culture of this cou	.315	.701	-.008	-.015	-.015
V4.1b If option 1 (state discretion) is amongst the alternatives chosen in 4.1a, specify the conditions for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship:It should be easier to acquire citizenship for foreigners who have family ties with this country (e.g. a spo	.841	.125	-.004	-.009	-.008
V4.1b If option 1 (state discretion) is amongst the alternatives chosen in 4.1a, specify the conditions for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship:It should be easiers to acquire citizenship for foreigners who have made contributions to this country in imp	.890	-.004	-.003	-.008	-.007
V4.1b If option 1 (state discretion) is amongst the alternatives chosen in 4.1a, specify the conditions for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship:It should be easier to acquire citizenship for foreigners who are citizens of EU	.178	.489	.009	.010	.012
V4.1b If option 1 (state discretion) is amongst the alternatives chosen in 4.1a, specify the conditions for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship:There should be universal rules for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship	-.076	-.060	-.617	-.406	-.339
V4.1b If option 1 (state discretion) is amongst the alternatives chosen in 4.1a, specify the conditions for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship:It should be easier to acquire citizenship for foreigners who adjusted to new society (Language, labourmarke	-.055	-.040	.795	-.235	-.208
V4.1b If option 1 (state discretion) is amongst the alternatives chosen in 4.1a, specify the conditions for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship:It should be easier to acquire citizenship for foreigners who lived in this country for a certain lenght (lo	-.038	-.025	-.075	.885	-.109
V4.1b If option 1 (state discretion) is amongst the alternatives chosen in 4.1a, specify the conditions for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship:It should be easier to acquire citizenship for foreigners who are loyalty to the state	-.031	-.019	-.054	-.095	.916

### Citizenship Criteria

specify the requirements for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship: Non-criminality record  
specify the requirements for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship: Passing a language test  
specify the requirements for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship: Passing an adaptation test  
specify the requirements for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship: Own income  
specify the requirements for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship: Renouncement of previous citizenship  
specify the requirements for foreigners' acquisition of citizenship: Long-term residence

### Dual Citizenship

	Component		
	1	2	3
V4.2 What is your opinion with regard to dual citizenship?:State should require renouncement of previous citizenships from all foreigners who apply for acquisition of citizenship	<b>.861</b>	-.234	-.222
V4.2 What is your opinion with regard to dual citizenship?:State should grant dual citizenship to all foreigners who qualify for acquiring citizenship in this country	<b>-.759</b>	-.353	-.331
V4.2 What is your opinion with regard to dual citizenship?:Generally positive to dual citizenship	-.016	<b>.959</b>	-.067
V4.2 What is your opinion with regard to dual citizenship?:No problem/neutral with dual citizenship	-.013	-.065	<b>.964</b>

### Free movement Policy

V4.4 Should all residents from EU-countries and Non-EU-countries be granted free movement within the whole EU on an equal basis?:  
There should be restrictions of these rights for all non-EU citizens.

V4.4 Should all residents from EU-countries and Non-EU-countries be granted free movement within the whole EU on an equal basis?:  
All persons from non-EU countries with valid entry visas should have the same rights to free mobility as citizens from other EU countries

V4.4 Should all residents from EU-countries and Non-EU-countries be granted free movement within the whole EU on an equal basis?:  
Citizens of non-EU countries with long-term residence in the EU should have the same rights to mobility as citizens from EU countries

V4.4 Should all residents from EU-countries and Non-EU-countries be granted free movement within the whole EU on an equal basis?:  
There should be differentiations in the right to free movement.

V4.4 Should all residents from EU-countries and Non-EU-countries be granted free movement within the whole EU on an equal basis?:  
There should be restrictions of these rights (e.g. with regard to employment, or residence for more than three months, financial ability...)

V4.4 Should all residents from EU-countries and Non-EU-countries be granted free movement within the whole EU on an equal basis?:  
There should be specific restrictions to the right to free movement of Roma people coming from other EU countries

V4.4 Should all residents from EU-countries and Non-EU-countries be granted free movement within the whole EU on an equal basis?:  
There should be specific restrictions to the right to free movement of prostitutes coming from other EU countries

V4.4 Should all residents from EU-countries and Non-EU-countries be granted free movement within the whole EU on an equal basis?:  
There should be specific restrictions to the right to free movement of poor or unemployed people coming from other EU countries

**Political Right for non-citizens**

	Component
	1
V4.5b Which political rights should non-citizens living in this country have, e.g. people coming from EU countries and other immigrants?: Passive voting rights at local level	.834
V4.5b Which political rights should non-citizens living in this country have, e.g. people coming from EU countries and other immigrants?: Passive voting rights at national level	.923
V4.5b Which political rights should non-citizens living in this country have, e.g. people coming from EU countries and other immigrants?: Passive voting rights at European level	.931
V4.5b Which political rights should non-citizens living in this country have, e.g. people coming from EU countries and other immigrants?: Active voting rights at local level	.740
V4.5b Which political rights should non-citizens living in this country have, e.g. people coming from EU countries and other immigrants?: Active voting rights at national level	.938
V4.5b Which political rights should non-citizens living in this country have, e.g. people coming from EU countries and other immigrants?: Active voting rights at European level	.919

**Welcome groups**

V4.7 Which groups of immigrants should be let into the country?: Labour migrants
V4.7 Which groups of immigrants should be let into the country?: Spouses and family members of resident migrants
V4.7 Which groups of immigrants should be let into the country?: Refugees and asylum seekers
V4.7 Which groups of immigrants should be let into the country?: Highly educated/qualified people
V4.7 Which groups of immigrants should be let into the country?: Poor migrants
V4.7 Which groups of immigrants should be let into the country?: Migrants with health problems
V4.7 Which groups of immigrants should be let into the country?: Co-ethnics
V4.7 Which groups of immigrants should be let into the country?: Culturally / religiously similar migrants
V4.7 Which groups of immigrants should be let into the country?: Muslim migrants
V4.7 Which groups of immigrants should be let into the country?: Migrants from different regions
V4.7 Which groups of immigrants should be let into the country?: Illegal migrants

**Preference in migration policy**

	Component
	1
V4.8 Should this country have entry, work and settlement permit policies and rules which give equal treatment to all? Or should we have favourable policies for citizens of specific countries (e.g. EU countries, countries with historical relationships to th	.966
V4.8 Should this country have entry, work and settlement permit policies and rules which give equal treatment to all? Or should we have favourable policies for citizens of specific countries (e.g. EU countries, countries with historical relationships to th	.978
V4.8 Should this country have entry, work and settlement permit policies and rules which give equal treatment to all? Or should we have favourable policies for citizens of specific countries (e.g. EU countries, countries with historical relationships to th	.968
V4.8 Should this country have entry, work and settlement permit policies and rules which give equal treatment to all? Or should we have favourable policies for citizens of specific countries (e.g. EU countries, countries with historical relationships to th	.770

### Asylum policy

V4.9 Are refugee and asylum seeker flows a problem for this country?: Some asylum seeker groups with known inability to integrate/adapt in this country should not be accepted

V4.9 Are refugee and asylum seeker flows a problem for this country?: Quota refugees should not be accepted if they belong to the problematic migrant populations in this country

V4.9 Are refugee and asylum seeker flows a problem for this country?: Other arrangements than individual asylum should be made to help refugees and asylum seekers in regional safe zones close to their home countries

### European communication sub-spaces

	Component					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
V5.1 Is there one common European communication space today?:Question not answered	-.239	<b>.524</b>	.353	.059	<b>-.611</b>	-.136
V5.1 Is there one common European communication space today?:The respondent has no information	-.161	.310	.068	-.011	<b>.768</b>	-.366
V5.1 Is there one common European communication space today?:One common European communication space does NOT exist today	-.301	<b>-.811</b>	-.167	.175	-.071	-.027
V5.1 Is there one common European communication space today?:There is a common European communication space of experts (e.g. academia, research institutions, universities)	<b>.677</b>	-.096	.301	.143	.046	.068
V5.1 Is there one common European communication space today?:There is a common European communication space of political parties and leaders	<b>.754</b>	-.194	.055	.039	-.026	-.045
V5.1 Is there one common European communication space today?:There is a common European communication space of social movements (e.g ATTAC, social fora, SocialPlatform, ENAR, etc)	<b>.788</b>	-.055	.072	.015	-.019	-.042
V5.1 Is there one common European communication space today?:There is a common European communication space of European media	<b>.600</b>	.150	-.207	.051	-.026	-.057
V5.1 Is there one common European communication space today?:There is a common European communication space of European citizens and residents	<b>.413</b>	.222	-.349	-.046	-.053	.068
V5.1 Is there one common European communication space today?:There is a common European communication space, not specified	.005	.358	<b>-.720</b>	.166	-.018	.192
V5.1 Is there one common European communication space today?:There is a common European communication space (the Internet)	.108	.106	.211	<b>.381</b>	.077	-.341
V5.1 Is there one common European communication space today?:There is a common European communication space for elites	-.055	.144	.324	.197	.264	<b>.834</b>
V5.1 Is there one common European communication space today?:Other common European communication spaces	.130	-.013	.076	<b>-.893</b>	.032	.066

## Exclusion for the EPS

	Component						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
V5.2 If there is a European communication space, do you think that it excludes important possible participants?:Question not answered	-.116	<b>-.686</b>	.374	-.189	-.162	-.264	-.200
V5.2 If there is a European communication space, do you think that it excludes important possible participants?:An elite public sphere excluding normal citizens	-.019	<b>.863</b>	.063	-.099	.043	-.127	-.072
V5.2 If there is a European communication space, do you think that it excludes important possible participants?:A public sphere of the representatives of the Member States, excluding representatives of minorities	<b>.578</b>	.305	-.006	.065	-.219	-.094	-.053
V5.2 If there is a European communication space, do you think that it excludes important possible participants?:A public sphere of member states` governments, excluding the national and regional level political opposition	<b>.727</b>	-.053	-.170	-.099	-.015	.042	.033
V5.2 If there is a European communication space, do you think that it excludes important possible participants?:A public sphere of the richer ones, excluding socially disadvantaged people	.284	.329	.056	<b>.496</b>	-.171	-.139	-.090
V5.2 If there is a European communication space, do you think that it excludes important possible participants?:A public sphere of firms and corporations, excluding employees and workers	<b>.407</b>	.414	.455	.030	-.198	.183	-.056
V5.2 If there is a European communication space, do you think that it excludes important possible participants?:A male public sphere, excluding women	<b>.732</b>	-.021	.015	.078	.339	-.023	.003
V5.2 If there is a European communication space, do you think that it excludes important possible participants?:European communication space does not exclude	-.026	-.018	.045	-.022	-.025	<b>.959</b>	-.030
V5.2 If there is a European communication space, do you think that it excludes important possible participants?:A public sphere which excludes uneducated people	-.108	-.109	-.021	<b>.890</b>	.058	.041	.024
V5.2 If there is a European communication space, do you think that it excludes important possible participants?:A public sphere of the larger EU members, excluding the smaller ones	.044	.071	.056	-.016	<b>.902</b>	-.023	-.033
V5.2 If there is a European communication space, do you think that it excludes important possible participants?:A public sphere, excluding possible participants due to language diversity	-.005	-.005	.041	-.017	-.032	-.028	<b>.982</b>
V5.2 If there is a European communication space, do you think that it excludes important possible participants?:Other forms of exclusion	.177	.081	<b>-.859</b>	-.009	-.111	-.020	-.065

## Partners of Cooperation

	Component					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:Question not answered	-.046	<b>-.629</b>	.022	-.188	-.097	.016
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:European Commission	<b>.484</b>	.529	.217	-.145	-.177	-.162
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:Council of the European Union	<b>.781</b>	.317	-.026	-.010	-.004	-.084
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:European Council	<b>.700</b>	.294	.152	-.171	-.097	-.099
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:Presidency of the Council	<b>.827</b>	.224	.147	-.064	.013	-.053
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:European Parliament	.242	<b>.782</b>	.135	.034	-.085	.113
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:European Court of Justice	<b>.596</b>	.235	<b>.420</b>	-.127	.024	.005
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:European Court of Auditors	<b>.759</b>	.056	<b>.403</b>	.195	.116	.092
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:European Ombudsman	<b>.809</b>	-.028	.196	.287	.120	.092
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:European Economic and Social Committee	<b>.763</b>	.050	.323	.278	.122	.094
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:European Committee of the Regions, Agencies	<b>.780</b>	.035	.143	.303	.161	.100
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:Council of Europe	<b>.498</b>	.028	.246	<b>.491</b>	.024	.046
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:European Court of Human Rights	<b>.539</b>	.058	<b>.550</b>	-.008	.024	.017
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:Citizens in general	.160	<b>.725</b>	.182	.029	.217	.017
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:Ethnic minority organizations/networks	.149	.199	<b>.846</b>	.155	.035	-.008

V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:Religious organizations/networks	.337	.090	<b>.756</b>	.158	.107	.009
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:Gender organizations/networks	.253	.237	<b>.836</b>	-.085	-.044	-.063
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:Other organizations/networks	.184	<b>.482</b>	.236	<b>.423</b>	.086	-.054
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:Lobbies	<b>.700</b>	.273	.213	-.155	-.060	-.156
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:Political parties and/ or party families	.136	<b>.765</b>	.210	.126	.141	.206
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:Certain groups- or communities	.242	.228	.224	.235	<b>.652</b>	.014
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:National Government/parliament/decision-makers	-.052	.085	-.067	-.199	<b>.812</b>	-.069
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:Local governance	-.029	.155	-.034	-.104	-.065	<b>.929</b>
V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e. regional and/ or local) do you want to address with your activities?:Other	-.057	.312	-.019	<b>.703</b>	-.114	-.130

### Appendix 3: Selected Political Parties

Austria	SPO AUT	SPÖ Social Democratic Party of Austria
	GRUNE AUT	The Austrian Greens (Die Grünen)
	FPO AUT	FPÖ Austrian Freedom Party
Belgium	PS BEL	Partie Socialist
	MR BEL	Mouvement Réformateur
	LCR BEL	Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire
Bulgaria	BSP BUL	Bulgarian Socialist Party
	GERB BUL	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria
	ATAKA BUL	National Union Attack (Ataka)
	MRF BUL	Movements for Rights and Freedoms
Czech Rep	ODS CZE	ODS Civic Democratic Party
	CSSD CZE	CSSD Czech Social Democratic Party
	KSCM CZE	KSCM Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
Denmark	V DEN	Venstre Denmark's Liberal Party
	SD DEN	Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne)
	SF DEN	SF Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti)
	DFP DEN	Danish Peoples Party (Dansk Folkeparti)
Estonia	ERP EST	Estonian Reform Party (Eesti Reformierakond)
	ESDP EST	Estonian Social Democratic Party
	EIP EST	Estonian Independence Party
Finland	KESK FIN	KESK Centre Party of Finland
	SDP FIN	SDP Social Democratic Party
	SFP FIN	SPP The Swedish People's Party
France	UMP FRA	Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire)
	PS FRA	Socialist Party
	CRP FRA	Corsican Regional Parties
Germany	CDUCSU GER	CDU/CSU Christian Democratic Party/Christian Social Union
	SPD GER	SPD German Social-Democratic Party
	B90GRUNE GER	The Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen)
Hungary	MSZP HUN	Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt)
	FIDESZ HUN	Fidesz
	MKMP HUN	Hungarian Communist Worker Party (Magyar Kommunista Munkáspárt)
Italy	PD ITA	Partito Democratico
	PDL ITA	Popolo della Liberta
	LN ITA	Lega Nord
Norway	DNA NOR	Det norske arbeiderparti - Norwegian Labor Party
	H NOR	Høyre (Conservative Party)
	FRP NOR	Fremskrittspartiet - Progress Party
	SP NOR	Senterpartiet - Center Party

Netherlands	CDA NET	Christian Democratic Party
	GL NET	Green Left (GroenLinks)
	PvDA NET	PvDA Labour Party
	SP NET	Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij)
	VVD NET	VVD Liberals
Spain	PSOE SPA	PSOE Spanish Socialists
	PP SAP	Peoples Party (Partido Popular)
	IU SPA	IU United Left (Izquierda Unida)
	CiU SPA	Convergence and Union (Convergencia i Unió)
Turkey	AKP TUR	The Justice and Development Party
	CHP TUR	The Republican People's Party
	DTP TUR	The Democratic Society Party
UK	LAB UK	Labour
	CON UK	Conservatives
	PC UK	Plaid Cymru